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When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic
Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to
Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out
Kristen Underhill t
The rise of "nudges "has inspiredcountless efforts to encourage individual
choices that maximize personaland collective welfare, with a preferencefor less
restrictive tools such as setting default options or reorderingchoice sets. As part
of this trend, there has been renewed interest in the behavioral impacts of
incentives-namely, rewards or penalties for shaping individual choices,
including but not limited tofinancial incentives.Explicit incentives arepervasive
in the law, including carrotsoffered by governments (for example, tax deductions
for charitable contributions, rebates for recycling, sentence reductions for
prisoners who complete drug rehabilitation programs, and incentives for
criminal informants) and statutes or regulations that govern incentives offered
by privateparties (for example, workplace wellnessprograms, compensationfor
blood andorgan donation,andpay-for-performancein executive compensation).
But despite the intuitive appeal of incentives, legal commentatorshave expressed
increasingalarm about a potentialdrawback: researchin behavioraleconomics
andpsychology has come to show many ways in which the use of carrots and
sticks may displace other motivationsfor good behavior,such as altruism, civic
duty, or professionalism.
In legal scholarship,prevailing views of motivational crowding-out-the
process by which incentives can interfere with "intrinsic" motivations for
behavior-suggest that this phenomenon is an irremediable response to
incentive-basedpolicies. This Article examines a large but neglected body of
empirical and theoreticalliterature on motivationalcrowding-out to show that
these beliefs may be misguided. Motivationalcrowding-out is infact a catch-all
termfor a diverse set ofcognitive and behavioralprocesses that rangefrom longterm changes in preferences, to the impairment of self-determination, to a
complex set of signals that incentives can send to people about their abilities,
social environment, values, and employers. Far from being inevitable,
motivational crowding-out is responsive to changes in the way we design
Fellow in Law & Health, Yale Law School. J.D., Yale Law School (2011); D.Phil.,
Oxford University (2007). 1 am grateful to Ian Ayres, Abbe Gluck, David Grewal, Amy Kapczynski,
Daniel Markovits, William M. Sage, participants in the Petrie-Flom 2014 Annual Conference, and
attendees at the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 2014 Health Law Professors Conference
for discussions about motivational crowding-out effects and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. All
errors herein are my own.
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incentive-based policies. That is, once we understand the mechanisms of
crowding-out, we can modify the incentive architecture to either minimize or
amplify crowding-outeffects. Remedies, however, must be tailoredto the diverse
causes of crowding-out, andthe law has not yet recognized thisproblem. In light
of deep anxieties about motivational crowding-out throughout the law, this
Article proposes a taxonomy of crowding-out processes and introduces
"incentive architecture:" the deliberate structuring of incentives to address
crowding-outeffects.
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Extrinsic Incentives
Introduction

Imagine that you have newly taken charge of a local government, say as
mayor of a large city, and you must confront a range of social, environmental,
and health problems. Rates of recycling are waning, pollution is high, residents
are evading local taxes, public schools report poor student attendance, obesity
and smoking are up, and low rates of flu vaccination pose a public health danger.
You may also believe that there is room for improvement in the productivity of
city employees, and you would love to secure support for building a new
wastewater treatment plant. Despite extensive public education campaigns by
your predecessors, these issues have seen little to no improvement in prior years.
You are, of course, wary of imposing outright mandates for many of these
problems: even if the city council supported new ordinances addressing such
behaviors (for example, mandatory recycling or flu vaccination), the backlash
would be politically costly, and you would be assured an expensive and
potentially unsuccessful courtroom battle. So instead, you design a sophisticated
and progressive system of incentives (blessed, perhaps, by deep city coffers).
You will pay rebates for recycling; offer free public transit fares on days with
elevated air pollution; provide tax credits for prompt tax payment; offer students
cash for perfect attendance; make small payments to families who receive flu
vaccines, lose weight, or stop smoking; offer merit-based bonuses to city
employees; and promise additional tax credits to the neighborhood where you
plan to build the plant. Your colleagues in city council agree, and you implement
your incentive programs, eagerly anticipating improvements.
But what if your plans backfire? What if, contrary to your expectations,
your incentives actually increase tax noncompliance, smoking, weight gain,
truancy, and car use, while decreasingrecycling, flu vaccination, civil servant
productivity, and support for your development project? Or what if you see
temporary improvements-but when budget cuts put an end to your carrots, the
problems return more acute than they were before? Worse yet, what if other good
behaviors that were left unincentivized (for example, voting and energy
conservation) now begin to decline? All of these effects are contemplated
impacts of the displacement of "intrinsic" motivations by "extrinsic" carrots or
sticks, a phenomenon known as motivational crowding-out.I
Each of the foregoing examples is drawn from the vast literature on
motivational crowding-out, which considers how incentives may have
counterintuitive and counterproductive effects on human behavior.2 In many

1. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protectionsfor Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REv.
1151, 1178-79 (2010).
2.
For some of the most recent and comprehensive overviews of crowding-out to date,
see BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY (1997); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable
Goods and the Emergence oJSharingas a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004);
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ways, law has entered an era of nudges, deprioritizing mandates and commandand-control regulation in favor of choice architecture and subtler ways of
achieving behavioral goals. Rewards are widely viewed as a less forceful means
of influencing behavior, compared to mandates or penalties. 3 Given this shift, the
potential drawbacks of carrots and sticks have gained increasing attention, with
concerns about motivational crowding-out taking center stage.4 Crowding-out
has animated commentary and development regarding many incentive-based
legal rules, including whether paying organ donors5 or Good Samaritans6 crowds
out altruism, whether pay-for-performance crowds out professionalism and
intrinsic motives for good work, 7 whether incentives for whistleblowers crowd
out their moral motivations, 8 whether complete contracts-those that cause
agents to internalize every benefit and every cost of their actions-crowd out
mutual trust, 9 whether compensating jurors crowds out civic duty,"0 and whether
heightened tax penalties may reduce moral or social reasons for compliance.II
The concept of motivational crowding-out derives from research conducted
in psychology and economics in the 1970s, beginning in seminal fields such as
payment for blood donation and educational achievement, and expanding over
the decades to encompass a broad range of incentive programs. Legal scholars
have discussed motivational crowding-out in every area that attempts to shape
human behavior, in fields as diverse as health law, employment law, tax, torts,
contracts, criminal law, intellectual and real property law, and education. Across
these and other areas, crowding-out has met with a variety of receptions, ranging

Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or
Complements?, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 368 (2012); Yuval Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling
Intrinsicand Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: Theoreticaland Empirical Insightsfrom the Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11 (2011); Feldman & Lobel, supranote 1; Bruno S. Frey &
Reto Jegen, Motivation CrowdingTheory: A Survey ofEmpiricalEvidence, 5 J. ECON. SURvS. 589 (2001);
Marianne Promberger & Theresa M. Marteau, When Do Financial Incentives Reduce Intrinsic
Motivation? Comparing Behaviors Studied in Psychological and Economic Literatures, 32 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 950 (2013).
3.
See, e.g., RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF
INCENTIVES 41 (2012).
4.
See, e.g., Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Matter: Refraining the Crowding Out
Effect of Legal Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1081 (2014) (describing crowding-out concerns in
conjunction with several incentive-based policies).
5.
See David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 574-75 (2014).
6.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 98-100 (1978).
7.
See Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences
of "Pay for Performance, " 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 552-53 (2014).
8.
See David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes,
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 616
(2014); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1.
9.
See Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust,
and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131 (2001).
10.
See Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury Cola: Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate
JurorsAdequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 379 (2002).
11.
See, e.g., Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: TaxpayerSupport
for Government Spending and the Efficiency ofthe Tax System, 66 TAx L. REV. 179, 203-04 (2013).
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from outright dismissal, to cautious concern, to acceptance as a justification for
barring incentives altogether. Legal scholarship is increasingly committed to
many views of this behavioral phenomenon, including the view that it does not
exist. But in order to engage productively with crowding-out-to dismiss it, to
evaluate it, or to embrace it-we need a careful and nuanced account of the
phenomenon and its manifestations in the law. In the absence of this account,
concerns about crowding-out have been "muddled:" 12 the term "crowding-out"
has been used to encompass a range of different effects, and there has been no
systematic inquiry into either crowding-out processes or the incentive designs
that may remedy these problems.
Unlike prior legal scholarship, which focuses on whether crowding-out
occurs, I answer the more complex questions of what crowding out is, and
whether it might be remediable. This is the first legal scholarship to interrogate
the different mechanisms by which motivational crowding-out occurs. My
examination of the empirical literature in psychology, economics, and public
health identifies four separate, empirically-supported mechanisms by which
incentives (i.e., carrots, sticks, or mandates) may diminish intrinsic motivations
such as altruism, professionalism, or civic duty. Evidence for these processes
includes field and laboratory experiments that impose rewards or penalties for
performance of a task, then measure indicators of intrinsic motivation (for
example, overall behavior, free time spent on a task, willingness to spend
resources, or self-reported motivation). Where incentives backfire or produce
relative declines in other indicators of intrinsic motivation, the findings are
consistent with crowding-out. I will discuss four major crowding-out processes:
signaling effects, impaired self-determination, endogenous preference changes,
and "learned helplessness." By overlooking heterogeneity across crowding-out
mechanisms, legal scholars have allowed crowding-out to become a mysterious
malaise of incentive-based legal rules, and we continue to neglect opportunities
to evaluate and alleviate the potentially counterproductive effects of incentive
schemes.
This is also the first Article to link crowding-out to the way incentives are
designed-what I will call "incentive architecture." I introduce the term as
distinct from "choice architecture" because incentives differ from nudges
generally. Nudges influence decisions without changing the character of those
choices, and as such, they exclude subsidies, taxes, and fines. 13 Classic examples
of nudges include reordering options or setting default choices. Because default
rules are unavoidable, choice architecture-namely, the setting of entitlements,

Mark Schlesinger, Crowding Out: Multiple Manifestations,Muddled Meanings,37
12.
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 851 (2012).
See Cass Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 413, 417 (2015)
13.

(defining "nudges" to exclude interventions that "impose significant material incentives," including taxes
and fines). Of course, the effort involved in choosing against a default rule, such as opting in to organ
donation or out of default savings plans, is a cost. But choice architecture scholars would not consider this
to be a "material incentive."
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orders, and defaults 4-is inevitable. But unlike nudges, incentives alter the costs
and benefits of available options. They impose separable costs and benefits on
agents, apart from the consequences of the choice itself. For example, giving
rebates for recycling bottles changes the decision to recycle; now recyclers
receive money, which is separable from any other benefits they may accrue from
the choice. By adding separable rewards or penalties, incentives interfere with
the conscious decision-making process, rather than capitalizing on inertia or
cognitive biases. Automatically enrolling employees in a savings plan is a choice
architecture decision; matching their savings up to a 5% contribution is an
incentive architecture decision. Unlike choice architecture, the use of incentives
is not inevitable. 15 Where crowding-out takes place, tailoring incentives to the
specific mechanisms driving the behavior is crucial, because a remedy for one
mechanism may exacerbate another mechanism (for example, increasing an
incentive may reduce crowding-out if agents view incentives as a sign of task
value, but it could worsen crowding-out due to framing effects). Although
tailored solutions may be difficult to implement, crowding-out is a diverse
phenomenon that requires a nuanced set of solutions.
My analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces the general
phenomenon of motivational crowding-out and the empirical evidence
supporting these effects. In Part II, I provide an in-depth look at the different
processes that give rise to crowding-out. Each is supported by evidence from
economics, psychology, and empirical legal research, and each presents different
implications for intervention. In Part III, I identify how the design of incentives
may influence motivational crowding-out effects. This Part serves as an
introduction to incentive architecture, and it considers a series of decisions that
governments and private principals must make when structuring and
implementing incentive plans. Throughout this Part, I emphasize that remedies
for crowding-out must be tailored to the mechanisms by which crowding-out
occurs.
1. Motivational Crowding-Out
Motivational crowding-out looms large in discussions of law and public
policy design, particularly in the last decade of behavioral law and economics
research. This Part will demarcate intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational
motivations; describe motivational crowding-out effects; and illustrate several
areas in private law and public policy where crowding-out effects are relevant.16

14.
Id.
15.
An alternate view here may be to consider the lack of an incentive to be an incentive
architecture decision; if we take this perspective, incentive architecture is also inevitable. The key point
here, however, is that while there must always be defaults and entitlements, separable incentives are
deliberate and not inevitable-the default is always the absence of an incentive.
16.
This Article is primarily concerned with motivational crowding-out. But regulators,
legal scholars, and courts have also used crowding-out terminology in other circumstances, generally
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Throughout the Article, "agents" are individuals engaging in a task of interest,

while "principals" are governments, employers, or others attempting to influence
agents' choices using incentives. 17 "Motivation" will denote a reason for an

individual choice, considered as both a categorical variable (multiple reasons
may exist) and a continuous variable (the strength of an individual reason for
behavior is a quantity of motivation). Multiple motivations can drive the same
behavior-for example, the decision to pay taxes may reflect not only a fear of
being caught evading, but also a genuine dedication to civic duty, the desire to
conform with social norms that discourage evasion, and intrinsic preferences for
obeying the law. The relative balance of these motivations, however, is a key
concern for crowding-out theory.
This Part will begin by presenting the difference between intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation. The central fear of crowding-out is that the use of incentives
will strengthen extrinsic motivations at the expense of intrinsic motivations, so
defining these categories is an essential foundation. The second section of this
Part will define motivational crowding-out and discuss a brief history of research
on the interaction between incentives and motivation. I will then summarize the

empirical evidence that supports this phenomenon. I will conclude this Part with
several illustrations of how motivational crowding-out is relevant to the law,

providing examples from health law, employment, torts, and other areas.
A. Defining Terms: IntrinsicMotivation, Extrinsic Motivation, and Incentives

Crowding-out theory rests on the distinction between two types of
motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic. Commentators differ in the extent to which
they include reputational or "image" motivations as a separate third category; I
will do so below.
Conventional economics considers material self-interest to be our primary
motivation.' 8 But evidence supports the influence of innumerable other
referring to incursions (often governmental incursions) into areas of limited scope, such as markets or
geographical areas. Regulations governing the State Children Health Insurance Program, for instance,
require states to implement measures that minimize "crowding out" of private and employer-sponsored
plans. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 457.805 (2014). Similar concerns have arisen in the case of governmentoffered flood insurance. See Richard A. Epstein, Hayekian Socialism, 58 MD. L. REv. 271, 296 (1999);
Michael Murray, Note, The Law ofDescribing Accidents: A New Proposalfor Determining the Number
of Occurrences in Insurance, 118 YALE L.J. 1484, 1522 (2009). Courts have used "crowding-out"
language to comment that invasive biological organisms can displace native species from their habitats,
see Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011), and to suggest that frivolous
claims may displace meritorious litigation from judicial dockets, see O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614,
618 (9th Cir. 1990). 1propose that these variations be labeled "market share crowding-out" to distinguish
them from "motivational crowding-out."
17.
t follow Gerrit De Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci in characterizing
lawmakers/incentivizers as principals and citizens/incentivized persons as agents. See, e.g., Gerrit De
Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrotsand the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 341,
357 (2013). My use of these terms throughout this Article, however, does not require a formal principalagent relationship as defined by agency law.
18.
See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social PreferencesMatter-The Impact of
Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperationand Incentives, 112 ECON. J. Cl, CI (2002).
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motivations, including reciprocity,' 9 inequity aversion,2" altruism, 21 spite, 22
26 civic duty,27 morality, 28
envy, 23 curiosity, 24 autonomy, 25 professionalism,
love, 29 dedication to an organizational mission, 3 intellectual passion, 31 intrinsic
preference for obeying law, 32 the desire to be a faithful fiduciary, 33 and
amusement3 4 (to list only a few). Self-interest and other motivations may coexist. Lawyers are paid for their advocacy, but they may also seek to fulfill
intrinsic motivations such as deep concern for their clients, pride, genuine belief
in professional standards, and the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity. Despite
the long-standing premise that agents are "knaves," economics research
increasingly accommodates motivations beyond economic self-interest, and
35
indeed it must do so to explain phenomena like crowding-out.
Each of the motivations listed above falls under the umbrella of intrinsic
motivation. Intrinsic motivation is "the inherent satisfaction[]" of a task, while
extrinsic motivation is the desire for a "separable outcome," 36 such as a reward

19.
20.
21.
22.

See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, andLaw, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333 (2001).
See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 18, at C3.
Id.
Id.

23.

Id at C4.

24.

See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations:

ClassicDefinitions and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54, 56 (2000).

25.
See, e.g., Frank Eijkenaar et al., Effects of Pay for Performancein Health Care: A
Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews, 2 HEALTH POL'Y 115, 125 (2013) (describing the impact of
pay-for-performance programs on physicians' perceived professionalism and autonomy).
26.
Id.
27.
See Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, MotivatingEnvironmentalAction in a Pluralistic
Regulatory Environment: An ExperimentalStudy of Framing,Crowding Out, and Institutional Effects in
the Context ofRecycling Policies, 46 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 405, 411 (2012).
28.
See Nina Walton, Crowding Theory andExecutive Compensation, 13 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 429, 435 (2012) (noting "social preferences" that motivate behavior).
29.
See Feldman, supra note 2, at 12.
30.
See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Competition and Incentives with
Motivated Agents, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 616, 630 (2005) (highlighting nonprofits, public bureaucracies,
and education providers as examples where agents are involved in "mission-oriented production" with a
non-pecuniary interest in performance); Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, Pride andPrejudice: The
Human Side of Incentive Theory, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 990, 992 (2008) (noting the difference between
profit-maximizing and mission-oriented motivations).
31.
See Richard S. Saver, Is It Really All About the Money? Reconsidering NonFinancialInterests in Medical Research, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 467, 468 (2012).
32.
See Robert Cooter, The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law: Economic Analysis of the
Internal Viewpoint, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1275, 1275-79 (2006).
33.
See also Jason F. Shogren, Money Pumps & Nudges, 37 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE
ECON. 349, 355 (2012) (listing examples of motivations that may be crowded out by incentives).
34.
Id.
35.
See Robert Cooter, Who Gets on Top in Democracy? Elections as Filters, 10 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 127, 129-30 (2003).
36.
See GRANT, supra note 3, at 113; ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS 68 (1999);
Benkler, supra note 2, at 323-24; Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of Intellectual
Property Laws' Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1935 (2014) (describing intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation); Feldman, supra note 2 (same); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1,at 1178 (reviewing
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation); Ryan & Deci, supra note 24, at 55-56.
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or avoidance of a penalty.37 Extrinsic motivations are generally associated with
material rewards, although this category is broad enough to include other
external influences such as mandates. 38 Many commentators have described the
difficulty of separating intrinsic and extrinsic motivation;3 9 for example,
motivations such as the desire to increase self-esteem or avoid guilt may appear
on either side of this line. 40 Literature on crowding-out often reflects a preference
for intrinsic motivations as more laudable than their "impoverished" extrinsic
counterparts. 41 This is to be expected, as fears about motivational crowding-out
presume that intrinsic motivations are worth preserving. Commentators alarmed
by crowding-out invoke "altruism, reciprocity, and.., civic virtues, 42 and using
incentives that displace these values may draw us closer to Hume's view that
"every man ought to be supposed ... to have no other end, in all his actions, than
private interest. '43 But it is important to avoid overlooking intrinsic motivations
that may be less laudable, such as envy, spite, anger, revenge, or discriminatory
intent. Although intrinsic motivations may not be uniformly noble, however,
they may be instrumentally beneficial. Intrinsic motivation has been associated
with increased satisfaction and learning; 44 lower costs for principals attempting

37.
Some consider intrinsic motivations to denote any motivations "that were present
before the introduction of external rewards." See Antoine Beretti et al., Using Money to Motivate Both
"Saints" and "Sinners": A FieldExperiment on Motivational Crowding-Out, 66 KYKLOS 63, 66 (2013).
This temporal definition, however, neglects any extrinsic motivations that predate incentive schemes.
38.
See Feldman, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that scholars in this field now consider
extrinsic motivators "to include not only monetary rewards, but also various legal, verbal, social, and
organizational mechanisms which attempt to cause people to engage in socially desirable behaviors").
Most research on motivational crowding-out, however, has focused on the effect of financial rewards. See
id. at23.
39.
See, e.g., Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, A Price Is a Signal: On Intrinsic
Motivation, Crowding-Out, and Crowding-In, 63 KYKLos 9 (2010); Feldman, supra note 2; Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: Comment on Feldman, 35 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 53, 55-59 (2011); Ryan & Deci, supranote 24, at 60-62.
40.
Ryan & Deci, supranote 24, at 62 (classifying both as "extrinsic").
Id. at 55; see also IAN AYRES, THE $500 DIET 38-43 (2010); Samuel Bowles,
41.
Policies Designedfor Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine "The Moral Sentiments": Evidencefrom
Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605, 1606 (2008); William M. Sage, Some PrinciplesRequire
Principals:Why Banning "Conflicts ofInterest" Won't Solve Incentive Problems in BiomedicalResearch,
85 TEx. L. REV. 1413, 1427 (2007) (noting an "undercurrent" of "moral judgment" in discussions about
financial incentives for researchers, in which commentators "seem to be looking for 'pure-hearted
professionals' whose raisond'etre is to pursue the ideals of science").
42.
Samuel Bowles & Sung-Ha Hwang, Social Preferences and Public Economics:
MechanismDesign When Social PreferencesDepend on Incentives, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1811, 1812 (2008).
43.

Id. at 2 (citing DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: THE MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 117

(T.H. Grose & T.H. Green eds., 1964) (1742)); see also Bruno S. Frey, A Constitutionfor Knaves Crowds
Out Civic Virtues, 443 ECON. J. 1043 (1997) (using Hume's language to suggest that legislating on the

presumption that individuals will behave in purely self-interested ways will indeed encourage selfinterested behavior); Adrian Vermeule, Hume's Second-Best Constitutionalism,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421,
424-26 (2003) (suggesting that rules designed on the basis of"the knavery principle" may displace publicspirit).
44.
See Bruno S. Frey, On the Relationship Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work
Motivation, 15 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 427, 435-36 (1997); Bruce J. Winick, Harnessingthe Power of the
Bet: Wagering with the Government as a Mechanismfor Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 737, 1761 (1991).
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to secure good performance in all activities (not just the incentivized tasks);4 5
and improvements in self-monitoring, problem-solving, and cognitive
46
processing.
Publicly observable behaviors present a special motivational case. Scholars
48
47
such as Roland Bnabou and Jean Tirole and Dan Ariely and colleagues
divide motivations for prosocial, public behavior into three categories: intrinsic
motivation, extrinsic motivation, and "image" or reputational motivation-the
desire to shape others' perceptions of oneself.49 Reputational motivations are not
purely intrinsic: social standing, including one's opinion of oneself, is separable
from the task itself. Such motivations are also not purely extrinsic, as they do not
immediately advance material self-interest. Although a good reputation or selfimage may ultimately produce material gain, an interim step is needed to
transform goodwill into gain (e.g., using social connections to obtain a job or
contract). Both extrinsic and reputational motivations are doubtless
instrumental. 5° For this analysis, however, it is not necessary to resolve
definitively whether reputational motivations are a distinct third category or a
subset of extrinsic motivation. It is sufficient to note that incentives may interact
with reputational motivations, just as they can interact with intrinsic motivations.
Identifying the precise type, number, and strength of motivations explaining
any particular action is daunting and perhaps impossible, even for individual
agents. The mix of motivations for a given action is "unobservable," 51 multiple
types of motivation may coexist, 52 and the balance will change across people and
time.5 3 For example, several studies have identified cultural54 and gender-based 55
differences in intrinsic motivation. Such distinctions also yield differences in

45.

See Winick, supra note 44.

46.

See Stephanie Stem, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral

Analysis of FinancialIncentives, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 541, 564 (2006).
47.
Roland Bdnabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and ProsocialBehavior, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 1652, 1654 (2006).
48.
Dan Ariely et al., Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary
Incentives in Behaving Prosocially,2009 AM ECON. REV. 544, 544-45 (2009).
49.
Id. (using image motivation to explain why "people will act more pro-socially in the
public sphere then in private settings," such as by contributing named gifts
to charities); see also Roberto
Censolo et al., Electromyographic Activity of Hand Muscles in a Motor CoordinationGame: Effect of
Incentive Scheme and Its Relation with Social Capital,6 PUB. LIBR. SCi. ONE e17372, 2 (2011) (noting
that "individuals are intrinsically motivated to social relations ...[as] distinct from the explicit goal that
actually prompts [a] behavior"). Others have classified reputational concerns as intrinsicmotivations. See,
e.g., Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 64.
50.

See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 95 (2006); Benkler, supranote

2, at 279.
51.
Bdnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1654.
52.
See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 39, at 56.
53.
See Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 63-64.
54.
See Robert Eisenberger et al., Effects ofReward on Intrinsic Motivation-Negative,
Neutral, and Positive: Comment on Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999), 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 677, 678
(1999).
55.
See Rachel Croson & UriGneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 448 (2009).
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crowding-out effects. This variation poses a problem for remedying crowdingout in policy and law,5 6 given that universal policies may interact with different
57
motivations in various segments of the population.
To take blood donation as an example, one study has found that incentives
for blood donation may crowd out willingness to donate among women, but not
among men. 58 One explanation for this effect is that women are more motivated
by prosocial concerns; another may be that women are more motivated by the
reputational benefits gained from uncompensated altruistic behavior. 59 A
European survey found that, although residents of many countries disapprove of

financial incentives for blood donation, there is cultural variation in acceptance
of non-monetary incentives, with highly positive views in Austria and negative
views in Italy and Sweden. 60 Cross-cultural variations in motivations and the

acceptability of incentives are an important topic for research on crowding-out,
but empirical studies are just beginning to consider these factors. There has been
little, if any, attempt to account for these differences in the design of incentivebased policies to date.
Building on the definitions above, "incentives" are penalties or rewards
intended to shape agents' behavior by supplying extrinsic motivation. Ruth Grant
has provided a helpful definition: an incentive is
(1) an extrinsic benefit or a bonus that is neither the natural or automatic consequence of inaction
nor a deserved reward or compensation; (2) a discrete prompt expected to elicit a particular
response; and (3) an offer intentionally designed to alter the status quo by motivating a person
6
to choose differently than he or she would be likely to choose in its absence.

Incentives must be known to the agent in advance of his choice; they differ,
that is, from windfalls.

62

56.
See Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 63-64 ("[I]ndividuals may differ in their degree
of compliance with some particular kind of intrinsic motivation, such as altruism,... [and] several logics
of intrinsic motivations-not only altruism but also shame, guilt, self-esteem, reputation concern, etc.may be at work to varying degrees in different individuals. Neglecting this heterogeneity might distort our
understanding of the crowding-out phenomenon at the aggregate level.").
57.
See id. at 64.
58.
See Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, Do All Material Incentives for Pro-Social
Activities Backfire? The Response to Cash and Non-Cash Incentivesfor Blood Donations, 31 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 738 (2010) (finding a strong aversion to cash payments among women, compared to men); Carl
Mellstrdm & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS'N 845 (2008) (finding that financial incentives may reduce donations by women, but not men);
c.f Joan Costa-Font et al., Not All Incentives Wash out the Warm Glow: the Case of Blood Donation
Performance
Paper
No.
1157,
2012),
Revisited
16
(Centre
for
Econ.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/47679/1/libfile REPOSITORYContentCentre for EconomicPerformance
Discussionpapersdpl 157.pdf (finding that men are more accepting of monetary incentives for
donating blood).
59.
See Mellstrom & Johannesson, supra note 58.
60.
See Costa-Font et al., supranote 58, at 16.
61.
GRANT, supranote 3, at 43.
62.
See Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 628 (1999).
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Incentives need not be financial; verbal praise or censure, public
recognition or shaming, criminal penalties, grades, and promotions are a few
examples. Although the crowding-out literature often focuses on positive
incentives-carrots that improve the agent's position relative to her ex ante
status-incentives also include sticks 63 and mandates. Entire regulatory regimes
64
have been classified as incentives, such as the design of national constitutions,
tax law, 65 the tort system, 66 contract enforcement regimes, 67 and workplace
regulations. 68 Incentives are agnostic to agents' other motivations, and they are
particularly attractive when complete contracts are impossible due to incomplete
69
information or public policy reasons for nonenforcement.
B. MotivationalCrowding-Outand the SeparabilityAssumption
At one time, "the relationship between rewards and motivation was
considered to be one of the clearest links in the social sciences,"7 growing out
of psychological research on conditioning behavior 7' and early uses of incentive
pay for worker performance in the early 1900s. 72 The traditional view is known
as "the separability assumption" 3-the idea that intrinsic motives and incentives
are independent or "additive" in their influence on behavior. 74 Research as early
63.
Some incentives may walk a fine line between "negative" and "positive," such as
reductions in an expected criminal sentence, insurance premium, or tax refund. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The
Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV.
797, 804-05 (2012) (noting that when a stick is a reduction of an expected benefit, the distinction between
carrot and stick is murky). Carrots and sticks may be refrained so that they are synonymous; "carrots can
be rewritten as sticks and vice versa." De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 17, at 349. There are,
however, important differences between the two approaches, including the fact that sticks "can make
citizens worse off while enforcement with carrots cannot." Id. at 364.
64.
See Frey, supra note 43; Vermeule, supra note 43, at 425 ("Designing institutions
for knaves may itself beget knaves.").
65.
See Frey, supra note 43, at 1050; Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement:
From "Big Stick" to Responsive Regulation, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 381, 402-03 (2009).
66.
See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 39.
67.
See Bohnet et al., supra note 9.
68.
See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey, Shirking or Work Morale?: The Impact of Regulating, 37
EUR. ECON. REV. 1523 (1993).
69.
See Bowles, supra note 41, at 1605-06.
70.
Amy Rummel & Richard Feinberg, Cognitive Evaluation Theory: A Meta-Analytic
Review of the Literature, 16 SOc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 147, 147 (1988) (citing early crowding-out
research). For an overview of other early studies, see Deci et al., supra note 62, at 627 (citing research in
the education field from 1971 onward).
71.
Deci et al., supra note 62.
72.
See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 3, at 14-30 (describing the history of sociallyengineered incentives in labor management, socialist economics, and behavioral psychology); MICHAEL
J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY 86-87 (2012); Edward L. Deci, The Effects of Contingent and
Noncontingent Rewards and Controls on Intrinsic Motivation, 8 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE
217 (1972).
73.
See Bowles, supra note 41, at 1605; Alfie Kohn, Why Incentive PlansCannot Work,
HARv. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 2, 7.
74.
See, eg., SANDEL, supra note 72, at 122; Walton, supra note 28, at 436 ("Agency
theory accepts that individuals may have social preferences; however ....
it assumes that the effect of
incentives is strictly an additive to underlying social preferences .... ").
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as 1968, however, suggested that rewards had diverse and potentially detrimental
effects.75 Separate strands of research in psychology and economics 7 6 have
investigated this phenomenon since the 1970s, 77 particularly incited by Richard
78
Titmuss's seminal 1971 argument against payment for blood donation,

Kenneth Arrow's famous rejection of Titmuss's theory,7 9 Edward Deci's studies
of motivation, 80 and Mark Lepper's study of incentives for education. 81 Both
disciplines now cast doubt on the separability assumption, 82 and incentives are
now expected to have two separate effects: (1) the "disciplining effect" or
"relative price effect," which refers to the extent to which an incentive supplies
extrinsic motivation, 83 and (2) crowding-out (or crowding-in), which refers to
the way in which incentives interact with intrinsic motivations.
Motivational crowding-out occurs when introducing an incentive for a task
provokes a loss of intrinsic motivation. 84 Synonyms include the "hidden cost of
reward,"85

the

"corruption

effect,

'86

the

"undermining

effect," 87

the

75.
See Rummel & Feinberg, supranote 70, at 147.
76.
The contemporary psychology literature is most defined by the work of Edward
Deci, while much of the recent research on crowding-out in economics is by Bruno Frey. See BENKLER,
supranote 50, at 93-94 (summarizing current literature).
77.
See, e.g., Benkler, supranote 2, at 321-23; Frey & Jegen, supra note 2, at 589-90;
Uri Gneezy et al., When and Why Incentives (Don 't) Work to Modify Behavior, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 191,
193 (2011); Uri Gneezy, The W Effect of Incentives, 21-22 (U. Chi. Working Paper, 2003).
78.
RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1971 );see also BENKLER, supranote
50, at 93 (describing Titmuss's work); Walton, supra note 28, at 437 (citing Titmuss's work as "the first
to raise the theoretical possibility of crowding out").
79.
See SANDEL, supra note 72, at 125-26 (recounting the Titmuss-Arrow
disagreement); Kenneth J.Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972).
80.
See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic
Motivation, 18 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1971).
81.
See Mark R. Lepper et al., Undermining Children 's IntrinsicInterest with Extrinsic
Reward: A Test of the "'Overjustification
"Hypothesis, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1973);
see also Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury Cola: Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate Jurors Adequately,
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.& PUB. POL'Y 289, 379 n.359 (2002) (describing how Lepper's work "is often noted
in the psychology literature as the prototype for intrinsic motivation").
82.
For a survey of the crowding-out literature, see Bowles, supranote 41, at 1606; Deci
et al., supra note 62; Frey & Jegen, supra note 2; Promberger & Marteau, supra note 2, at 950-52
(discussing economic and psychological literature on crowding-out).
83.
Frey, supra note 44, at 429; see also Frey, supra note 43, at 1046; Frey & Jegen,
supranote 2, at 593; Gneezy et al., supra note 77, at 192 (discussing the "standard direct price effect").
84.
Some have suggested that intrinsic motivations may crowd one another out; for
example, the motivation to satisfy "visceral" needs such as hunger or pain may trump other motivations.
See, e.g., Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645,
1683 (2004); Jon Hanson & David Yosifoa, The Situational Character:A CriticalRealistPerspective on
the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 121-22 (2004). This dynamic, however, is outside the scope of my
analysis.
85.
See, e.g., Frey, supranote 43, at 1044; Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The
Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. EcoN. REV. 746,
746 (1997).
86.
See Shogren, supra note 33, at 355 (listing synonyms for this effect).
87.
See Christopher P. Cerasoli et al., Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives
Jointly PredictPerformance:A 40-Year Meta-Analysis, 140 PSYCHOL. BULL. 980 (2014).
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"overjustification effect,"8 8 and "the price of a price."89 The reverse of crowdingout, of course, is crowding-in, in which the incentive not only exerts a relative
price effect on behavior but also simultaneously augments intrinsic motivation.9"
Given the normative preference for intrinsic motivation, however, crowding-in
is rarely cited as a cause for concern about incentive-based policies. 91 Where
crowding-out occurs, the net impact of an incentive depends on the relative
strength of the disciplining effect compared to the crowding-out effect. Where
the disciplining effect is stronger, an incentive can have a net behavioral benefit,
although this benefit will be lessened by crowding-out effects.
To date, the crowding-out literature has not distinguished between absolute
and relative reductions in intrinsic motivation. I shall attempt to do so. When an
incentive causes an absolute reduction, intrinsic motivation is lower than it
would have been without the incentive. This is the classic concern about
crowding-out effects; if this effect is severe, crowding-out may yield net worse
behavior. 92 But crowding-out should also encompass a relative reduction of
intrinsic compared to extrinsic motivation, whereby the absolute measure of
intrinsic motivation may be unchanged, but extrinsic motivation is now the
driving force behind the agent's choices. 93 Although relative losses of intrinsic
motivation may not undermine incentive effects, they may have important
impacts on performance quality. 94
Several prerequisites are needed for either type of crowding-out to occur.
First, intrinsic motivation must exist for the task, and crowding-out concerns may
be more applicable when intrinsic motivation is high. 95 Some have interpreted
this to mean that crowding-out can only occur when incentives are applied to
"interesting tasks," 96 but intrinsic motivations may also drive boring or

88.
See Bdnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1654; Deci et al., supra note 62, at 630.
89.
Maarten C.W. Janssen & Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst, The Price of a Price: On the
Crowding Out andIn of Social Norms, 55 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 377 (2004). When rewards are offered
by companies seeking to reward consumer behavior, crowding-out has also been described as
"promotional reactance." Ran Kivetz, PromotionReactance: The Role of Effort-Reward Congruity, 31 J.
CONSUMER RES. 725 (2005).
90.
Frey & Jegen, supra note 2, at 593.
91.
To the extent crowding raises concerns about autonomy, however, crowding-in
should be equally distressing as crowding-out.
92.
See Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 65.
93.
Of course, any time an incentive is introduced, even a de minimis desire to obtain
that incentive will alter the balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. But the concerns of
crowding theorists, particularly concerns about performance quality and future performance, are most
acute when extrinsic motivations overtake intrinsic motivations as the primary motivators of behavior.
94.
These impacts may include "choking," changing behavior to emphasize short-term
performance rather than long-term progress, and distraction. See Buccafusco et al., supra note 36, at 1972
(describing choking behavior, and finding no evidence of choking as defined by less creativity in the
presence of incentives); Kristen Underhill, The Harms and Benefits of Motivational Crowding-Out and a
Justification for Regulating Incentive-Based Policies 25 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
95.
Frey, supra note 44, at 431.
96.
See, e.g., Kou Murayama et al., Neural Basis ofthe UnderminingEffect ofMonetary
Reward on IntrinsicMotivation, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Scis. 20911, 20912 (2010).
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unpleasant tasks, such as donating blood or recycling. Second, the agent must

know or expect the incentive before he undertakes the task. Third, because the
mechanisms for crowding-out are cognitive, the task must demand a decision by
the agent; activities beyond the agent's control or ability may respond to neither
intrinsic nor extrinsic motivation.
Empirical evidence for motivational crowding-out comes from many
98
settings,97 including at least ten meta-analyses in psychology and economics.

The most recent systematic review of this literature identified 183 primary
studies over four decades of research, documenting evidence of crowding-out in
education, the workplace, and physical activity. 99 Econometric studies have

modeled crowding-out effects in subject areas including volunteering, paid labor,
tax evasion, and the siting of socially beneficial but locally undesirable projects;

97.
See, e.g., Bowles, supra note 41, at 1606 (summarizing forty-one studies).
98.
The most recent of these is Cerasoli et al., supranote 87. Past meta-analyses include
the following: Judy Cameron et al., Pervasive Negative Effects of Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation: The
Myth Continues, 24 BEHAV. ANALYST 1 (2001) (reviewing 145 studies to suggest that "[n]egative effects
are found on high-interest tasks when the rewards are tangible, expected (offered beforehand), and loosely
tied to level of performance," but casting doubt on a "pervasive" motivational crowding-effect); Judy
Cameron & W. David Pierce, Reinforcement, Reward,and IntrinsicMotivation:A Meta-Analysis, 64 REV.
EDUC. RES. 363 (1994) (reviewing ninety-six experimental studies to suggest a negative effect of
incentives "only... when expected tangible rewards are given to individuals simply for doing a task");
Edward L. Deci et al., Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motivation in Education: Reconsidered Once
Again, 71 REV. EDUC. RES. 1 (2001) (identifying differences between meta-analyses by Cameron & Pierce
(1994) and Deci et al. (1999) and arguing that the meta-analysis by Deci et al. is of higher methodological
quality); Deci et al., supra note 62, at 627, 632 (reviewing 128 primary studies to conclude that
"engagement-contingent, completion-contingent, and performance-contingent rewards significantly
undermined free-choice intrinsic motivation ... as did all rewards, all tangible rewards, and all expected
rewards," and criticizing prior meta-analyses by Eisenberger, Cameron, and Pierce that had cast doubt on
the crowding-out phenomenon); Robert Eisenberger & Judy Cameron, DetrimentalEffects of Reward:
Reality or Myth?, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1153, 1153, 1162 (1996) (re-analyzing findings from Cameron
& Pierce (1994) to conclude that "detrimental effects of reward occur under highly restricted, easily
avoidable conditions," in which a reward is "presented on a single occasion without regard to the quality
of performance or task completion," or when the reward is given "for a low degree of divergent [creative]
thought;" this study also concluded, however, that "either a small reward or a large, nonsalient reward can
be effectively used to increase generalized creativity"); Eisenberger et al., supra note 54, 677 (criticizing
the findings of Deci et al. (1999)); Rummel & Feinberg, supranote 70, 159 (reviewing forty-five studies
to conclude that "indeed, there is a detrimental effect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation");
Alexander D. Stajkovic & Fred Luthans, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of OrganizationalBehavior
Modification on Task Performance, 1979-95, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1122, 1140 (1997) (reviewing nineteen
studies to find that, when financial and nonfinancial incentives were combined, the financial incentive
neither helped nor diminished the intervention effect); Shu-Hua Tang & Vemon C. Hall, The
Overjustification Effect: A Meta-Analysis, 9 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 365, 365, 368, 373 (1995)
(reviewing fifty experimental studies to find evidence for crowding-out "across age, dependent measure,
and design type in specific situations where it is predicted to occur," namely, where "intrinsic interest is
initially high, the reward is task contingent, expected, and tangible with no additional feedback," or where
the reward is given without any feedback affirming the agent's competence in performing the task); Uco
J. Wiersma, The Effects of Extrinsic Rewards in Intrinsic Motivation: A Meta-Analysis, 5 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 101 (1992) (analyzing twenty studies of tangible incentives to find
that "support for the overjustification effect occurs only when intrinsic motivation is operationalized as
task behaviour during a free-time measure," not when it is assessed by task performance).
99.
Cerasoli et al., supra note 87. Another recent overview of evidence for using
incentives to motivate educational performance, prosocial behavior, and health behaviors appears in
Gneezy et al., supra note 77.
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economic laboratory and field studies have also documented crowding-out
effects for motives as diverse as volunteerism, reciprocity, work effort, altruism,
norm adherence, environmentalism, civic duty in the use of shared resources,
trust, and civic virtue in the presence of adversary institutions.' A large body
of research has also examined the impact of performance-related pay,' 0 ' with
varying findings that have included reduced satisfaction among highly motivated
reduced productivity among those who perceive bonuses to be
employees,' 02' 0and
"controlling."' 3 Empirical studies more frequently focus on crowding-out
effects resulting from rewards instead of penalties, although evidence exists for
crowding-out in both scenarios. 04 Several physiological studies have also
documented biological evidence of crowding-out effects-changes in brain and
muscle activity associated with the imposition and withdrawal of incentives for
05
completing cognitive and physical tasks.'
Although legal scholarship has primarily engaged with motivational
crowding-out through theory, several empirical papers have specifically
considered crowding out in relation to legal rules.' 016 In one analysis, Yuval
Feldman and Oren Perez surveyed 1,800 residents of Israel about three
hypothetical environmental laws-mandatory bottle deposits, fines for dumping
bottles, and an ethical code without penalties-asking them about their intrinsic
environmental motivation and predicted personal efficacy (compliance) in

See Frey & Jegen, supra note 2, at 599 (citing studies).
100.
101.
See, e.g., id.at 595-96 (describing research on pay-for-performance).
102.
Kirsten Bregn, Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public
Sector? On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective, 13 PUB. ORG. REV. 21, 28 (2013) (citing
A.M. Bertelli, Motivation Crowding and the Federal Civil Servant: Evidence from the U.S Internal
Revenue Service, 9 INT'L PUB. MGMT. J. 3 (2006)).
103.
Bregn, supra note 102, at 27 (citing L. Andersen & T. Pallesen, "Not Just for the
Money? " How Financial Incentives Affect the Number of Publications at Danish Research Institutions,
11 INT'L PUB. MGMT. J. 28 (2008)).
104.
Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 39, at 59-60.
See Censolo et al., supra note 49; Qingguo Ma et al., The Dark Side of Monetary
105.
Incentive: How Does Extrinsic Reward Crowd out Intrinsic Motivation, 25 NEUROREPORT 194 (2014);
Murayama et al., supra note 96.
See, e.g., Bohnet et al., supra note 9, at 132 (finding that moderate contract
106.
enforcement can crowd out trustworthiness); Buccafusco et al., supra note 36, at 1971 (showing that
incentives resembling patents do not impair creativity relative to other types of incentives); Alessandra
Cassar et al., Institutional Quality, Culture, and Norms of Cooperation:Evidence from Behavioral Field
Experiments, 57 J.L. & ECON. 821, 855 (2014) (finding that, in the presence of strong formal institutions,
trustworthiness does not influence cheating behavior); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1,at 1207 (finding
that offering whistleblowers incentives may decrease the reporting of illegal activity); Feldman & Perez,
supra note 27, at 433 (finding that among people with high environmental motivation, the behavioral
effects of fines for not recycling decreased as fines increased); Steven Kelman, Adversary and
Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking, 11 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 178, 179 (1992) (suggesting that adversarial institutions crowd out public spirit); Scott E. Masten
& Jens Prufer, On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 359, 359 (2014) (finding that the existence of courts can weaken community enforcement
of behavior); Brian Sheppard & Fiery Cushman, Evaluating Norms: An Empirical Analysis of the
Relationship Between Norm-Content, Operator, and Charitable Behavior, 63 VAND. L. REV. 55, 88
(2010) (finding that mandates requiring students to give charitably reduced giving below aspirational
statements encouraging giving).
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response to a randomly-selected law. 107 Findings were consistent with crowdingout theory, showing that the already-motivated individuals predicted low
personal responses to deposit programs and large fines. °8 Another empirical
study by Feldman and Orly Lobel found that offering monetary incentives to
whistleblowers may interfere with ethical and social image motivations to report
others' wrongdoing. 109 As another example of empirical legal scholarship on
crowding-out effects, Christopher Buccafusco and colleagues conducted a recent
simulation study of incentives for innovation, but found that incentives in this
0
instance did not impair creativity."I
2
The evidence for crowding-out is not uniform"' or without controversy. 1
Many incentives do have a net beneficial effect on behavior, even those that
cause some crowding-out, and some research has suggested that extrinsic
13
rewards or penalties can sometimes increase perceived self-determination,"
crowd in intrinsic motivation, or increase the internalization of norms.' 14 Much
evidence on crowding-out also supports the premise that it is context-specific

and differs by culture,t15 setting,1 6 age, 1' 7 and behavior. 18
C. Crowding-Out Concernsand Incentive-BasedPolicies

As suggested by the examples in the Introduction," 9 crowding-out concerns
have influenced commentary and at times rule development across a range of
substantive legal areas. Crowding-out is more frequently associated with positive

incentives compared to penalties or mandates, but all have given rise to

107.
Feldman & Perez, supranote 27.
108.
Cf id. at 432-33 (also finding, however, that highly-motivated residents did not
react negatively to low-level fines, which may give motivated people assurance that free riders would not
take advantage of their good behavior).
109.
Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1; see also Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention,
Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principlesfor DesigningEffective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEx. L. REV.
37, 46-47 (2012).
110.
See Buccafusco et al., supra note 36.
Ill.
See id. at 19435-43 (examining inconsistent research findings on how incentives
influence creativity).
112.
Wendy Netter Epstein, Public-PrivateContractingand the Reciprocity Norm, 64
AM. U. L. REV. 1,42 (2014).
113.
See, e.g., Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1180.
114.
See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
"expressive" effect of law.
115.
See Costa-Font et al., supra note 58 (finding national differences in the
acceptability of incentives for blood donation in fifteen European countries).
116.
Id. at 6 ("Most of the empirical studies suggest that crowding out is specific of the
particular settings individuals are in.").
117.
Deci et al., supra note 62, at 657 (finding more extensive crowding effects among
children compared to adults).
118.
See, e.g., Buccafusco et al., supra note 36, at 1976 ("[W]hen it comes to incentives
and creativity, context matters a lot"); Promberger & Marteau, supra note 2, at 954-55 (suggesting that
crowding-out effects for health behaviors may differ from other contexts).
119.
See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
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discussion in legal scholarship. (Mandates and negative incentives are
particularly blurred, as most mandates are enforced by fines, tort liability, or
criminal liability for noncompliance.) A select few illustrations will help to frame
the following discussion of processes by which motivational crowding-out may
occur. 12 0 I have organized these illustrations by the type of motivation that we
seek to preserve, including altruism, professionalism, and civic duty in the
following short, non-exhaustive list:
1. Altruism Crowding-Out
Perhaps the most well-known example of crowding-out concerns organ
donation, where many have considered the argument that permitting payments
for living donation (for example, of kidneys or bone marrow) may diminish
altruism among potential donors.12 The crowding-out argument provided one
justification for the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act, which criminalized the
acquisition, receipt, or transfer of human organs for "valuable consideration." 12' 2
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld the Act as applied to bone marrow donation
through aspiration (an invasive procedure), finding that crowding-out concerns
123
provided a rational basis for the ban on compensation.
The preservation of altruistic motives has also been at the heart of law
concerning Good Samaritan activity, on the basis that mandates or positive
incentives for rescuing others may crowd out more noble motivations. For
example, in Stockberger v. U.S., the Seventh Circuit refused to impose a
common-law duty to rescue (i.e., a mandate enforced by negative incentives
through tort penalties), noting that "liability [for not rescuing] might actually
reduce the number of altruistic rescues by depriving people of credit for
125
'
The same argument has been applied to market-based rewards
altruism."124
and mandates. Moreover, although most states offer rescuers a reduced standard
of care in tort for injuries inflicted during rescue, some only permit Good

120.
See Underhill, supra note 94 (providing a more comprehensive overview of
crowding-out across a range of incentive-based policies).
121.
See DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL
LIMITS OF MARKETS 192-95 (2010); Benjamin E. Hippen & Sally Satel, Crowding Out, Crowding in, and
Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR
COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS 96 (Sally Satel, ed., 2008); Richard A. Epstein, The Human and
Economic Dimensions ofAltruism: The Case of Organ Transplantation,37 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 474-81
(2008) (describing crowding-out and noting uncertainty about the applicability of evidence from other
fields); Horton, supra note 5.

122.

42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012).

123.
Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852,859-62 (9th Cir. 2012); see also John A. Robertson,
Paid Organ Donations and the Constitutionality of the National Organ Transplant Act, 40 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 221 (2013).

124.

Stockberger v. U.S., 332 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Dan M. Kahan,

The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71,79 (2003).
125.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 6.
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Samaritans to receive this benefit if their acts were "gratuitous and without
' 26
expectation of compensation."'

2. Professionalism Crowding-Out
Pay-for-performance (P4P) regimes, which reward employees or
contractors based on job performance, have drawn increasing criticism on the
grounds that they may crowd out professionalism, ethics, and inherent
satisfaction in job tasks.127 The federal tax code currently encourages pay-forperformance arrangements for executives of public corporations, which cannot
deduct executive salaries above $1 million unless the salary arrangement is

linked to performance goals. 2 Pay-for-performance programs have been
particularly controversial in health care as a means of paying individual
physicians based on quality of care. 29 In 2013, Congressional testimony on
Medicare payment structures included a description of potential crowding-out
effects associated with P4P. 13 ° Empirical evidence 3for crowding-out associated
with P4P in health care, however, has been mixed.' '
3. Civic Duty Crowding-Out
Positive incentives, negative incentives, and mandates have all aroused

concern on the basis that they crowd out citizens' sense of civic duty. This
commentary tends to focus on government-offered incentives or mandates for
voting, 132 tax payment, 133 jury service, 3 4 and local acceptance of public works

projects ("NIMBY" projects). 135 Frey has notably extended this principle to the
design of public laws, on the theory that highly restrictive or controlling legal
regimes communicate distrust of citizens.

136

In this view, laws that aim to

126.
See Victoria Sutton, Is There a Doctor (and a Lawyer) in the House? Why Our
Good SamaritansLaws Are Doing More Harm Than Goodfor a NationalPublic HealthSecurity Strategy:
A Fifty-State Survey, 6 J.HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 261, 277 (2010).
127.
See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 36; Stout, supra note 7, at 533; David A. Weisbach,
Expenditures, PrincipalAgent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823 (2006); Cynthia
A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social Reform of Banking, 39 J. CORP. L. 459,474 (2014).
128.
26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2012) (disallowing public corporations from deducting annual
compensation above $1 million for the CEO or top four highest compensated officers, if that compensation
is not tied to performance goals); see also Stout, supra note 7.
See, e.g., Eijkenaar et al., supra note 25.
129.
130.
MedicarePhysician Payment System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Health of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong., 126-138 (2013) (statement of Robert A. Berenson,
M.D., Institute Fellow, Urban Institute).
131.
Jon B. Christianson et al., Lessons from Evaluations of Purchaser Pay-forPerformancePrograms,65 MED. CARE RES. & REV. SS (2008).
Eric Fleisig-Greene, Law's War with Conscience: The Psychological Limits of
132.
Enforcement, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1203 (2007).
Listokin & Shizer, supra note 11.
133.
Seamone, supra note 10.
134.
Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 85.
135.
Frey, supra note 43.
136.
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"discipline" or control citizens through strict regulation or policing can erode
public trust and reciprocity motivations to comply with the law, encouraging
37
minor lawbreaking, tax evasion, and resistance to public works projects.1
Although these illustrations are far from exhaustive, they gesture toward
the breadth of crowding-out concerns in the law. Despite the pervasiveness of
crowding-out commentary, however, legal scholarship has an impoverished view
of what happens when crowding-out occurs. Whether or not crowding-out occurs
in any given domain is secondary to understanding precisely what crowding-out
is, and what forms it may take in response to incentive-based legal policies.
Although some legal scholars have noted that multiple types of mechanisms may
drive crowding-out, none have undertaken a classification of these effects, and
several have specifically declined to address this question. 38 This view impairs
efforts to address crowding-out through improvements in incentive design.
Crowding-out actually consists of several distinct processes, to which I will now
turn.
II. Heterogeneity in Motivational Crowding-Out Processes
The distinct processes animating crowding-out have not yet been
disaggregated in legal scholarship. Each of these behavioral models is grounded
in field and laboratory experiments interpreting variables such as time spent on
a task, willingness to spend resources, self-reported motivation, or physiological
data as evidence of motivation. Multiple mechanisms may also operate
simultaneously in a given context. 3 9 The remainder of this Part will consider
four categories of crowding-out mechanisms that may be triggered when a
principal offers an agent an incentive.
The first category includes signaling processes, by which incentives send
or disrupt informational signals. Incentives themselves can convey information
to agents, including information about the task itself (e.g., whether it is
dangerous), information about the principal's opinion of the agent (e.g., whether
the principal finds the agent trustworthy), information about the principal (e.g.,
whether the principal is wasteful), information about social norms (e.g., whether
the task is popular), and information about how the agent should make decisions
about the task (e.g., whether the choice is economic or moral). Incentives can
also interfere with the signals that an agent sends to others or herself about her
behavior; an agent may undertake a task like voting to show she is public137.
Id. at 1048.
138.
See, e.g., Atiq, supra note 4, at 1081; Benkler, supra note 2, at 326 ("For purposes
of my analysis here it is not necessary to pin down precisely the correct and most complete theory of
motivation or the full extent and dimensions of crowding out."); Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and
the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949,981 (2013).
139.
See Bowles, supra note 41, at 1606 (noting that separate crowding-out processes
"often work jointly and sometimes with opposite effect"); Walton, supranote 28, at 440 (noting that while
a single crowding mechanism may be "explanatory," it is likely that multiple mechanisms are working
simultaneously when crowding-out occurs).
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spirited, and a fine for nonvoting can interfere with this message. The second
category is the impairment of self-determination, by which incentives can reduce
agents' perceived autonomy and cause them to disengage. A third category is the
long-term adaptation of preferences, on the assumption that our values depend
in part on the rules and entitlements that surround us, including the presence of
incentives. Finally, I will note a less-accepted model of crowding-out known as
"learned helplessness," by which certain incentives may discourage people who
140
do not see a clear link between performance and reward.
A. Signaling Processes
All signaling processes assume that incentives affect the flow of
information. Sometimes incentives transmit information directly, which occurs
when incentivized agents interpret the incentive as information already known
by the principal, who offered them the incentive. This Section will begin by
noting these direct signaling processes, including how incentives may lead
agents to draw conclusions about the value of a task, their own abilities or
importance, the values of the principal who offered the incentive, social norms
governing the task, or whether decisions about the task should be self-interested
or not.
I will then consider how incentives disrupt the signals that agents try to send
to others through their behavior. An agent may act in order to cultivate his
reputation as altruistic, responsible, or civic-minded; if the agent receives a
reward for his behavior, however, observers might attribute his behavior to greed
rather than to his good character. This effect is image-spoiling when it refers to
an agent's reputation. When incentives reduce the agent's own self-image, it is
self-image spoiling. This Section will illustrate each of these processes below.
1. Principal Signaling to Agents
When a principal offers an incentive, the agent may interpret it as a signal
communicating the principal's private information,14' regardless of the
principal's intended meaning. This signal may cause the agent to update his
expectations of how attractive or burdensome the task is, how competent he will

140.
Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polania-Reyes have also proposed a four-part
categorization of crowding-out effects, including conveying information about the principal, framing
choices as self-interested, reducing agents' sense of autonomy, and influencing learned preferences.
Bowles & Polania-Reyes, supra note 2; see also Bowles, supra note 41, at 1606-08. My classification

differs from Bowles's four categories in several ways. I consider framing and "bad news" about principals
both to be signaling processes, along with other signals sent by the principal to the agent (including task
value, agent value, and social norms), signals sent by the agent to observers, and signals sent by the agent
to him- or herself Bowles does not consider this broad variety of signaling mechanisms. I also include
the "learned helplessness" explanation as a fourth category, although this addition is secondary to the prior
contributions.
141.

See Roland Bdnabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REv.

ECON. STUD. 489, 491 (2003).

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 33, 2016

be in accomplishing it, what the principal's motives or values may be, how the
task is perceived by others, and whether decisions regarding the task should be
governed by market norms or moral reasoning.
a. Incentives Can Communicate Information about the Task
Incentives may reduce intrinsic motivation when they signal to the agent
that the task is burdensome, unpleasant, or costly.1 42 Larger incentives may
increase the perception of the behavior as personally costly and thereby reduce
willingness to engage in the activity for its own sake. For example, agents paid
to donate blood may "view the payment ... as compensation for the risks of
donating."1 43 If the payments are higher than expected, indicating a higher-thanexpected risk, a risk-averse individual may decide to stop donating. 14 In one
potential test of this mechanism, a notable Swiss study asked citizens if they
would allow the government to build a nuclear waste plant in their town, given
the risks of accidents and groundwater contamination.1 45 Although
approximately 51% were initially willing to accept the repository, this
percentage dropped to approximately 25% when an annual monetary payment
was offered (ranging between $2,175 and $6,525 per year). One theoretical
explanation was that the payment signaled to the residents that the facility was
dangerous; although only 6% of respondents believed that the compensation
affected their risk perceptions in this case, 146 the explanation merits investigation
in other contexts.
Small incentives may also reduce intrinsic motivation when they signal that
a task is unimportant.1 47 Rewards provide a market valuation of agents'
performance (a price): when the price is lower than the agent expected, the agent
revises her belief in the task's value, and thereby becomes less motivated to
undertake the task.' 48 This effect may also be explained through "equity theory,"

142.

See id.at 494; Bdnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1654; Bolle & Otto, supra note

39; Censolo et al., supra note 49, at 1-2; Gneezy et al., supra note 77, at 192; Emir Kamenica, Behavioral
Economics and Psychology of Incentives, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 13.1, 13.18 (2012).
143.
Bolle & Otto, supra note 39, at 18.

144.
Id. Benhbou and Tirole describe this as the converse of the "forbidden fruit" effect,
in which penalties or prohibitions on an activity can increase its allure. Bnabou & Tirole, supranote 141,
at 490, 498.
Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 85.
145.
Id. at 749-50 (considering but rejecting the idea that incentives signaled danger in
146.
this instance); see also Bolle & Otto, supra note 39, at 18 (suggesting that paying blood donors may cause

them to revise upward their estimate of the physical risks associated with the donation process).
147.
"If paid, [the agent] receives a signal, namely a price, which she may perceive as
proportionate to the market value of her activity or as an estimate thereof by others. The consequence of
the adoption of this valuation is crowding-out if and only if her own estimation had been considerably
higher than ... the price offered." Bolle & Otto, supra note 39, at 10; see also Gneezy,supra note 77, at
20 (noting that incentives act to "complete" incomplete contractual arrangements, in effect setting task
price or value).
148.
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Bolle & Otto, supra note 39, at 11-13.
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which posits that agents try to balance their contributions with their rewards,
49
decreasing their effort when they believe the reward is too small. 1
b. Incentives Can Signal the Value of the Agent

Incentives may also provide information to agents about how the principal
views their motivation, competence, and trustworthiness. The effect of this signal
will vary depending on agents' interpretation. To the extent that large rewards

reinforce agents' belief in their own competence, these incentives may "impart a
competence-boosting message," particularly when incentives are contingent on

high-quality performance. 50 The signaling function of incentives may backfire,
however, if the agent interprets an incentive to mean that the principal is
pessimistic about the agent's competence, work ethic, or motivation, and that the
principal has therefore concluded that incentives are necessary. 15' This signal
may lower agents' confidence in their own skills, undermining motivation to
attempt the activity. When the agent perceives but disagrees with the principal's
view, he may feel that the principal undervalues his competence or motivation,
leading to a similar loss of self-esteem.' 52 Moreover, if the agent perceives an
incentive as indicating that the principal's expectations are low, the agent will

anticipate feeling less guilt for underperformance, which excuses a lower level
of engagement.' 53
Several studies have found that agents view incentives as information about
whether the principal finds them trustworthy, each demonstrating that agents

perform better on principals' behalf when the principal refrains from imposing
fines, lower boundaries on production, or penalties for shirking." 4 Indeed, where
Bregn, supra note 102, at 29. This effect may occur regardless of general
149.
compensation; for example, Uri Gnezy and Aldo Rustichini found that when subjects were paid a
participation fee for attending an experiment, and then offered an additional per-question amount to
answer questions, the per-question fee became their reference point for deciding how much effort to exert.
Subjects paid less per question exerted less effort, compared to those paid more. Participants who were
not paid an additional amount per question, however, often believed it was "their side of the bargain" to
answer the questions in return for the participation fee alone. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough
or Don't PayAt Al, 115 Q.J. ECON. 791, 803 (2000).
150.
Cerasoli et al., supra note 87, at 4; see also Deci et al., supra note 62, at 628-29
(contending that rewards are most likely to affirm competence where rewards are linked to performance
and the person receives an award signaling excellent performance). Frey suggests this may be one reason
why incentive pay is used more frequently for managers than for lower-level employees, as managers may
be more likely to understand incentives as performance feedback. Frey, supra note 44, at 437.
151.
See Brnabou & Tirole, supra note 141, at 494; Bruna Bruno, Rewarding My Self
The Role of Self Esteem and Self Determination in Motivation Crowding Theory 5 (MPRA Paper No.
23117, 2010), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23117/1/MPRA_paper 23117.pdf ("When individuals
perceive an external intervention as reducing their self determination, intrinsic motivation is substituted
by external control.").
152.
Frey & Jegen, supra note 2, at 594; see also Benkler, supra note 2 (describing both
Frey's and Bdnabou and Tirole's conceptions of the self-esteem theory).
153.
See Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 1611, 1623 (2006).
See id.; Brnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1655; Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk,
154.
Psychological Foundationsof Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 687, 698 (2002); Fehr & Fischbacher,
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agents can interpret explicit incentives-prizes, rules, or penalties-as a signal
of distrust, they may exert more effort under incomplete contract than when
provided with clear incentives.' 55 This result aligns with Bruno Frey's theory of
why corporations rarely seek bondage commitments from their employees; a
principal that requires agents to make such commitments reveals that he distrusts
the employee, which crowds out intrinsic motivations and skews the selection
pool of job applicants. 56 Frey has also commented on this dynamic in relation
to public laws, in that laws that "impl[y] a fundamental distrust of its citizens and
seek[] to discipline them tend[] to crowd out civic virtue and undermine[] the
157
support which citizens are prepared to exert towards the basic law."'
c. Incentives Can Reveal the Principal's Values
Incentives can signal information about the principal's character, including
that the principal is selfish, hostile, 58 immoral, or even in violation of an implicit
contract to behave reciprocally. 59 This is particularly true of fines as compared
to rewards; 60 and one economic game study has shown that agents interpret

supra note 18, at C22 (noting that incentives may create "a hostile atmosphere of threat and distrust");
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP.
159, 177 (2000); Ernst Fehr & John A. List, The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and
Trustworthiness Among CEOs, 2 J. EUR. EcON. ASS'N 743 (2004); Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach,
Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism, 422 NATURE 137 (2003); Frey, supra note 68
(referring to this dynamic as the "misattribution effect"); Gneezy et al., supra note 77, at 192; Florian
Herold, Contractual Incompleteness as a Signal of Trust, 68 GAMES & ECON BEHAV. 180 (2010). But see
Mary Rigdon, Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 93 (2009)
(finding that reward and punishment at low levels are no different from the absence of incentives, that the
availability of high punishment can induce investors to invest more, and that returns are highest when the
investor can provide a large reward).
See Epstein, supra note 112, at 40-41 (noting that less specific contracts may
155.
improve agent performance because they avoid "giv[ing] the agent the impression of a lack of trust");
Falk & Kosfeld, supra note 153, at 1613 (noting that many contracts are deliberately left incomplete as a
means of signaling trust in the agent); Herold, supra note 154. An incomplete contract also leaves open
the potential for additional rewards or fines, which may exert its own motivational effect. See, eg., Uri
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (2000).
Frey, supra note 44, at 437; Frey, supra note 68, at 1530-31.
156.
157.
Frey, supra note 43, at 1048.
158.
See, e.g., Ellingsen & Johannesson, supra note 30, at 991 (noting that principals
who do not exert control over agents "signal[] a prosocial attitude," and that although this makes no
difference to a selfish agent, "a prosocial agent has a stronger desire to make a good impression on a
prosocial principal than on a selfish one"); Herold, supra note 154, at 188 (presenting an economic model
in which complete contracts providing for incentives signal distrust).
Frey, supra note 68, at 1526. A more recent modeling study makes an analogous
159.
claim that motivational crowding-out is more likely among agents who are already specifically motivated
to advance the principal's interests. Harvey S. James, Jr. Why Did You Do That? An Economic
Examination of the Effect of Extrinsic Compensation on Intrinsic Motivation and Performance, 26 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 549, 562 (2005) (presenting an economic model suggesting that agents may perceive
incentives to be controlling when they are offered by employers or when they are too large).
Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 695 (using results of gaming studies to show that
160.
incentives can interact with intrinsic enjoyment, reciprocity, and image motivations). Agents may also
perceive small incentives to convey that the principal is insulting them. Crowding-out may depend on the
size of the incentive, with the potential interpretation that "people simply find it demeaning to work for a
small amount of money." Kamenica, supra note 142, at 13.10.
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manifestations of control as evidence of the principal's hostility, diminishing
reciprocity motivations to perform well.161 Lars Feld and Bruno Frey's model of
tax compliance suggests that when tax administrators treat taxpayers in an
authoritarian or arbitrary way, they violate an implicit "psychological tax
contract" committing to mutual respectful treatment, which undermines

reciprocity and increases evasion by taxpayers.' 62 Other studies have had similar
findings, 163 and some have suggested that stiff punishments may even activate
contrarian behavior due to spite. 64 Indeed, individuals may go out of their way
to punish people who are perceived as violating reciprocity norms, even when
165
the act of punishing is costly.

Researchers have named several specific crowding-out effects attributable
to signals about principals' values, including moral repugnance (which rewards
the signal that the principal has bad moral values) and the eviction effect (which
rewards the signal that the principal manages resources poorly). Antoine Beretti
and colleagues have suggested that positive incentives, particularly financial
rewards for altruistic behavior, may crowd out motivation by activating "moral
repugnance."' 66 This effect arises when a principal introduces incentives in "a

territory previously immune to []market forces," causing agents to disengage
out of distaste. 6 7 Uri Gneezy and colleagues illustrate with the example of asking

an attractive person for sex, and then offering to pay $20 for the privilege: "only
a certain kind of economist would expect [his or her] partner to be happier" under
these conditions. 6 8 Govind Persad has suggested the same dynamic for offering

161.
Falk & Kosfeld, supranote 153, at 1625-26 (using results of a laboratory gaming
experiment to show that agents viewed the principal to be controlling when the principal restricted their
choices, and that a majority of agents reacted negatively to this behavior by penalizing the principal,
resulting in lower returns).
162.
Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological
Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL'Y 102, 104 (2007).
163.
See, e.g., Fehr & Gdichter, supra note 154, at 170-72 (finding lower effort among
reciprocity-motivated agents when incentives were used); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdchter, Do Incentive
Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? (Zurich lEER, Working Paper No. 34, 2002),
http://ideas.repec.org/p/zur/iewwpx/034.html (finding that explicit performance incentives and a fine for
shirking reduced agents' average effort).
164.
Gneezy, supranote 77, at 24.
165.
See, e.g., Bowles, supra note 41, at 1608 (citing studies); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gdichter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 9 AM. ECON. REv. 980 (2000)
(finding in a public good contributions game that there is heavy punishment of free riders even when
punishment is economically costly); Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 706; Fehr & Gachter, supra note 154,
at 159; Fehr & Rockenbach, supra note 154, at 13.
166.
Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 67. This explanation recalls Yuval Feldman and
Oren Perez's discussion of motivational crowding-out when there is "a mismatch between ... subjects'
moral views and a certain regulatory instrument ... lead[ing] to behavior reversal." Feldman & Perez,
supra note 27, at 411.
167.
Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 68 (using a field survey to show that monetary
payments diminish participation in an environmental survey).
168.
Gneezy et al., supra note 77, at 201; Gneezy, supra note 77, at 6; see also
BENKLER, supra note 50, at 97 (noting the social impropriety of offering payment after sex, or of paying
friends for hosting dinner in their home).
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teenagers money to take the morning-after pill. 69 One empirical study offered
traditional healers a cash incentive to refer patients with certain ulcers to the
public health service; although healers in one country found it acceptable, those
in a nearby country revolted against the incentive as an effort to "pay for diseased
bodies."' 7 ° Moral repugnance has also been raised as an objection to paying
environmentalists to participate in an
research subjects' 7' and paying
72
survey.
environment-related
The "eviction effect" occurs when the principal is a charity, or is otherwise
using resources to achieve goals that are meaningful to the agent.' 73 If the
incentive is costly, then the agent may infer that the incentive depletes the
principal's resources to do good work. The agent will then be less motivated to
act in a way that triggers the payout.' 74 Some support for this hypothesis arises
from a set of interviews with Australian blood donors, who worried that "the
introduction of a cash incentive would be costly to the Blood Service and that
these resources would be better spent on operational needs."' 7 5 These donors
held similar views about other tangible rewards and in some cases would not
accept gifts unless they were76 donated or industry-sponsored, instead of
purchased using charity funds.1
When different incentives are offered across a group of agents, motivational
crowding-out may also be a response to perceived unfairness of the principal
across different agents. Simulation studies and field research have found that
employees reduce their effort if they know they are being paid less than a coworker.17 7 Notably, one study found that this reduction in effort was less severe
when participants were told that wages were randomly generated (not decided
by the principal); 78 this suggests that the driving force behind the motivational
effect is how agents interpret the incentive as information about the principal.

169.
Govind Persad, Libertarian Patriarchalism:Nudges, ProceduralRoadblocks, and
Reproductive Choice, 35 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 273, 292-93 (2014) (suggesting that "it may seem
repugnant to take [the pill] in order to receive $50-and the offer of money may convert" the decision
from acceptance to refusal).
170.
Priscilla Magrath & Mark Nichter, Paying for Performance and the Social
Relations of Health Care Provision: An Anthropological Perspective, 75 SOC. SCI. MED. 1778, 1783
(2012).
171.
Martin Wilkinson & Andrew Moore, Inducements Revisited, 13 BIOETHICS 114,
122-27 (1999) (summarizing and rejecting this argument).
172.
Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 64.
173.
Bdnabou & Tirole, supranote 47, at 1658.
174.
Id.
175.
Danielle Chmielewski-Ralmondo et al., A New Perspective on the Incentive-Blood
Donation Relationship: Partnership, Congruency, and Affirmation of Competence, 52 TRANSFUSION
1889, 1894-95 (2012).
Id.
176.
177.
Bregn, supra note 102, at 30.
178.
Id. at 30 (citing Simon Gachter & Christian Th6ni, Social Comparison and
Performance: Experimental Evidence on the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis, 76 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
531 (2010)).
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d. Incentives Can Reveal the Supportiveness of Social Norms
An incentive may also signal information about the way that other agents
behave.179 This effect may work in two opposing ways. When the incentive
suggests that social norms run counter to the principal's priorities, this may
induce crowding-out; but when the incentive exerts an "expressive" effect that
announces social norms that align with the principal's priorities, this may
conversely induce crowding-in.
Agents may interpret an incentive (particularly negative) as evidence that
intrinsic motivation is insufficient-that is, incentives are necessary because
social norms do not support the task. 8 ' Agents who seek to conform to or
reciprocate social norms will therefore update their own preferences with
reduced intrinsic or reputational motivation to engage. Dan M. Kahan has noted,
for example, that when the government conspicuously raises penalties for tax
evasions, this signal "causes individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they
thought are choosing to evade. This inference, in turn, triggers a reciprocal
motive to evade ... ."181 When signs beseech National Park visitors to refrain
from stealing park artifacts, they may encourage theft by communicating that
many tourists steal. 182 The escalation in bad behavior could be due to conformism
(people want to be like others), or reciprocity motivations vis-a-vis social
norms-people are "afraid of being chumps and are thus unwilling to comply
83
unilaterally."'
Conversely, an incentive might also have an "expressive" effect that
operates to align social norms with the principal's priorities, thereby crowding
in or augmenting intrinsic and reputational motivation. A number of legal
179.
Bowles & Hwang, supra note 42, at 6 (citing additional references); Dan M.
Kahan, supra note 124, at 79 (2003) ("Incentives do more than affect individuals' calculations of the costs
and benefits of particular forms of conduct; they also shape their impressions of the attitudes and intentions
of those around them."); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REv. 349 (1997).
180.
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Discipline and Nourish: On Constructing Commons,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 749 n.76 (2010); Wendy J.Gordon, OfHarms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution,
and Intellectual Property, 21 J.LEGAL STUD. 449, 457 (1992) ("[P]aying people to refrain from doing
[M]oral people might (inaccurately)
harm is likely to encourage precisely the wrong sorts of behavior ....
infer that one has no moral obligation to do the right thing unless one is paid."); Adrian Vermeule,
Precautionary Principles in Constitutional Law, 4 J.LEGAL ANALYSIS 181, 207 (2012).
181.
Kahan, supra note 19, at 342; see also Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax
112, 133-37 (2009); Fleisig-Greene, supra note 132, at 1212-13;
Compliance, 46 HARV. J.ON LEG IS. 11l,
Galle, supra note 63, at 834-35 (citing research by Cass Sunstein to suggest that "one possible symbolic
implication of paying actors to do good is that the 'expected' or default state is that they have no such
obligations"); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 1065,
1079-80 (2003) (rejecting this theory on the basis that penalties may be viewed as "just deserts" for
"dishonest outliers" who evade taxes). Similarly, Frank Cross has examined (and ultimately rejected) the
analogous claim that law itself can crowd out trust in society because "the protective nature of law signals
that trust is absent from the relationship." Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1498-1500
(2005); see also Bowles, supra note 73, at 73 (attributing this view to economist Robert Lucas).
182.
See IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS 79 (2010) (discussing the work of Robert
Cialdini).
Vermeule, supra note 180, at 207; see also Vermeule, supra note 43, at 424-25.
183.
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scholars including Robert Cooter, Dan Kahan, and Cass Sunstein have written
extensively on the expressive effects of law, suggesting that some laws "tip[] the
balance in favor of informal enforcement" even when formal enforcement is rare
(depending on the extent to which the public internalizes the norm).' 84 This may
be illustrated by Patricia Funk's study of voter turnout in Switzerland. When
several Swiss jurisdictions reversed their policy of fining nonvoters, these
jurisdictions actually experienced a decline in voting, and the impact was more
severe in jurisdictions that previously had a high voter turnout."8 5 Funk
interpreted this as evidence that the fine had previously had an expressive effect,
86
inducing citizens to vote due to "civic duty or fear of social sanctions."'
Removing the fine, therefore, may have expressed that voting was no longer as
important.
Crowding-out may also occur when agents interpret the size of an incentive
to signal the magnitude of social approval or disapproval associated with a
behavior. When a penalty is small, it is "a signal that the social damage is not as
high as she initially believed," causing agents to escalate bad behavior. 18 7 This
explanation may be supported by Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini's study from
an Israeli daycare center, which imposed a small fine for parents who picked up
their children late. 88 After establishing the fine, the daycare center experienced
an increase in the frequency of late pickups. This effect may be explained by
several different signaling mechanisms. One may be that the fine signaled to
parents that late pickups were common and that social norms about late pickups
were permissive. The small size of the fine might also have conveyed that even
the daycare center considered late pickups to be inconsequential. The incentive
thus influenced behavior not only via the desire to conform to others' actions,
18 9
but also via reduced reputational motivations to pick up children on time.

184.
Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression,Deterrence,
and Internalization,79 OR. L. REV. 1, 10-fi (2000) [hereinafter Cooter, Three Effects]; see also Robert
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of InternalizedNorms, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1577 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economies, 27 J.LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Alex
Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002); Hollander-Blumoff,

supra note 39, at 62-63 (describing how law's expressive effect and "the moral judgment that law carries[]
may provide protection against crowding out"); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. CHL L. REV. 591 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86
VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021

(1996); Feldman, supra note 2, at 16-22 (describing literature on competing models for legal compliance,
including the expressive effect of law).
185.
Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 135, 138 (2007). Funk cites similar evidence

of effective small incentives, such as fining company directors for missing meetings or fining players in
at 139.
public goods games. Id.
186.
Id.at 138.
187.
Bolle & Otto, supra note 39, at 18 (suggesting that this mechanism may explain
the daycare study).
188.
189.

Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 155, at 14.
Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 709.
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e. Incentives Can Reframe Choices as Self-Interested
Apart from conveying information about tasks, agents, principals, and
social norms, incentives may also shift agents' point of view by signaling that
self-interested behavior is appropriate.19 This phenomenon has variously been
called "framing" or shifts in "decisional mode." Incentives reframe tasks as
transactions with the possibility for selfish benefit, which may undermine
valuable other-regarding motivations such as altruism or a sense of fiduciary
duty. In effect, offering an incentive shifts the "decisional mode" from moral
reasoning to exchange.' 9' Another way to describe this phenomenon is that
92
incentives "change[] ... the relationship between the principal and the agent,"
yielding a more transactional interaction. This phenomenon is particularly
associated with financial incentives, as even small amounts transform tasks into
market transactions.193 These "subliminal effects"194 resonate with psychological
research showing that even thinking about money can make individuals less
likely to make and respond to requests for help.' 95 Framing effects are
particularly problematic for actions that rely on relationships to provide intrinsic
motivation (for example, altruism and reciprocity), and it aligns with the
observation that crowding-out may be exacerbated when incentives are
196
introduced despite a close relationship between the principal and agent.

A large body of empirical data provides support for framing effects. For
example, James Heymann and Dan Ariely have demonstrated that in socialmarket relationships (wherein effort is shaped by altruism), the "mere mention
of monetary payment" can transform perceived relationships into money-market

190.
Bowles, supra note 41, at 1606; see also Bowles & Hwang, supra note 42 (citing
additional studies supporting this view); Gneezy, supra note 77, at 25 (describing a shift from a
"communal" to an "exchange" interaction when incentives are present).
191.
See, e.g., STEPHAN MEIER, THE ECONoMICs OF NON-SELFISH BEHAVIOUR:
DECISIONS TO CONTRIBUTE MONEY TO PUBLIC GOODS 35 (2006). Schnedler and Vanberg have also noted

that offering a reward makes a behavior "tradeable" in social exchange. Wendelin Schnedler & Christoph
Vanberg, A Rationalefor Motivational Crowding Out, 1-2 (Discussion Paper Series in Economics and
Management, Paper No. 10-09, 2011), http://geaba.de/DP/DP- 10-09.pdf.
192.
Kamenica, supra note 142, at 13.9.
193.
See, e.g., Gneezy, supra note 77, at 27 (describing a W-shaped curve of incentives,
where behavior is higher with no incentive than it is with either a small fine or a small reward--"[E]ven
the smallest amount of extrinsic motivation can destroy the intrinsic motivation completely."); Gneezy &
Rustichini, supra note 149 (describing their finding that a group of subjects offered a tiny amount to
answer questions performed worse than those offered nothing); Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 155, at
15 (reiterating this finding); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 109, at 47 (noting in the context of
whistleblowing activity that "the introduction of money can reclassify action as an economic, rather than
pro-social, behavior and crowds out ethical intentions").
194.
Censolo et al., supranote 49, at 8.
195.
Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE
1154, 1154 (2006); see also Feldman, supranote 2, at 23-24 (describing research on the priming effect of
money).
196.
See Frey, supra note 43, at 1046; Stout, supra note 7, at 552-53 (noting that
incentives "change[] the social context," signaling "that the employer . . . views the employment
relationship as an arm's length exchange in which self-interested behavior is appropriate, expected, and
even encouraged").
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exchanges (wherein effort is shaped by compensation). 197 Some have suggested
that corporate ethics programs may replace moral motivations with extrinsic
incentives for ethical behavior; one study has found that individuals facing
decisions in conditions with compliance programs are more likely to view those
decisions as cost-benefit "business" choices, rather than ethical choices, because
'
incentives "put[] a price tag on behaving ethically."198
Framing effects may also
explain the lsraeli daycare study described above: "the imposition of a price [for
lateness] conveyed the message that the commodity of 'being late' could now be
'
bought,"199
transforming parents' perception of late pickups from an imposition
into a service that could be fully paid for (and absolved) by the fine.2 0 Another
example may be the American Association of Retired Persons' transactions with
lawyers, who refused to serve retirees at the low cost of $30 per hour, but agreed
to provide services for free. 01 "Once it was clear they were being asked to
engage in a charitable activity rather than a market transaction, the lawyers
20 2
responded charitably."
In another example, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff suggests that tort law
damages may reframe the act of harming others as a commodity that tortfeasors
can purchase, thereby lessening the motivation to avoid harming others for moral
reasons. 20 3 Funk suggests a similar explanation for reduced voting rates in a
Swiss jurisdiction that imposed a new fine on nonvoting; the fine allowed
citizens "to 'buy' not voting and removed... feelings of guilt. ' 204 Another Swiss
example arises from the study offering residents incentives for accepting a
nuclear waste facility in their town. 215 This incentive may have signaled to the
residents they should reason based on self-interest rather than on the public good;
when they considered their own self-interest, the payment was insufficient to
compensate for the facility's risks. 2 6 Similarly, in studies of contribution to
197.
James Heymann & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets, 15
PSYCHOL. Sc1. 787, 780, 792 (2004).
198.
Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs,39 J.
CORP. L. 769, 823 (2014) (citing MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE
FAIL TO DO WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2011)).
199.
Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 709.

200.
Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe analogize this to parking illegally on the street
where a parking ticket is $25, but a garage spot costs $30; "you're not doing the 'wrong' thing; you're
doing the economical thing." BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT

WAY TO Do THE RIGHT THING 190-91(2010).
201.
SANDEL, supra note 72, at 121 (citing research by Dan Ariely).
202. Id.
203.
Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 39, at 61.
204.
Funk, supra note 185, at 152-53.
205.
Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 85.
206.
For an explanation of this effect, see Barry Schwartz, Money for Nothing, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2007, at A2 1. Ultimately, the study authors determined that the crowding-out effect was
strongest among individuals who had indicated general support for nuclear technology as socially
beneficial, suggesting that the offer of a financial incentive specifically reduced "civic spirit" among those
who previously supported the project. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 85, at 753-54; see also
SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 200, at 192-93. This explanation may fall under several of the
mechanisms described here, including priming, image-spoiling, or moral repugnance. Similar dynamics
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public goods (or non-exploitation of a common resource), incentives have been
ineffective in encouraging socially-optimal behavior, perhaps because they
transformed contributing from 20a 7 social act into "an individual choice
motivated ... by private benefits."

2. Agent Signaling to Observers: Image-Spoiling
Incentives may also cause crowding-out when they interfere with a second
set of signals: the signals agents send to observers by their behavior. Social
capital is a critical resource, more valuable in some contexts than financial
rewards, 20 8 and incentives can interfere with agents' opportunities to increase
their social standing through activities that are prosocial, altruistic, or moral (e.g.,
contributing to charity, performing professional jobs, 20 9 or voting 2 °). That is,
incentives can crowd out reputational motivation.2 1 1 When observers can
attribute an agent's behavior to greed, the incentive "spoils" '212 or weakens the
good-character signal sent by his acts 2 13-or it may even send a bad-character
signal by marking him as greedy. If the agent worries that others will see him as
simply "doing well" [for himself] instead of "doing good," his reputational
motivation will diminish. 214 For example, someone recycling bottles may
ordinarily be seen as environmentally responsible; if others know that she
may also explain the results of a U.S.-based study, which found that tax rebates did not increase Nevada
residents' willingness to accept a nuclear waste facility in their town. Frey, supra note 43, at 1047 (citing
work by Howard Kunrcuther and Douglas Easterling).
207.
Andreas Fuster & Stephan Meier, Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The
Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement 24 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 09-2, 2009),
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/l0419/55597//593927435.pdf, see also Bowles, supra note 41, at
1606-07 (referencing a similar study).
208.
See BENKLER, supra note 50, at 95-96. This social approval is valuable for its own
sake, or it can be used to generate material benefits later. See Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 705; see
also Ariely et al., supra note 48, at 544 (noting that social capital is tradeable for "future extrinsic rewards,
like a political career or admission to a college"); Fleisig-Greene, supranote 132, at 1211-12 (interpreting
scholarship by Eric A. Posner to conclude that an individual who visibly abides by social norms
"demonstrates [to others] that he is a long-term type, desirable as a partner" for commerce).
209.
See, e.g., Eijkenaar et al., supra note 25, at 116 (noting "reputational incentives"
for physician performance compared to their peers).
210.
See, e.g., Patricia Funk, Social Incentives and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the
Swiss Mail Ballot System, 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 1077 (2010) (identifying the role of social incentives in
voting behavior).
211.
See Ariely et al., supra note 48 (presenting two experiments consistent with this
theory); Bnabou & Tirole, supra note 47 (explaining an economic model of individual behavior
incorporating intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational motivations); Gneezy et al., supra note 77, at 192-93
(suggesting that incentives can cause prosocial behaviors to signal "greediness" rather than "prosocial
preferences," thereby depleting agents' image motivations).
212.
Bnabou and Tirole have named this the "image-spoiling effect of rewards," which
I follow here. Bdnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1655. Frey has called this "impaired expression
possibility." FREY, supra note 2, at 17.
213.
Bdnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1654; see also Dan M. Kahan, supra note 179,
at 351 ("Individuals also draw such inferences [perceptions about social valuations] from the behavior of
other individuals; when the law regulates such behavior, it can either accentuate or mute these signals.").
214.
Ariely et al., supra note 48; see also Brian Galle, Tax, Command, . . or Nudge?:
Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 881 (2014); Kamenica, supra note 142, at 13.
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receives rebates for each can, however, she may be seen as simply "cheap. '215
The same is true of legal incentives, such as increased penalties for tax
nonpayment; when legal penalties require compliance, rule followers can no
longer signal their intrinsic commitment to social norms through their
behavior. 16 (That is, when there is "order without law," there is some concern
that imposing a law may degrade the order.) As Yochai Benkler has noted, "for
any given culture, there will be some acts that a person would prefer to perform
not for money, but for social standing, recognition, and probably, ultimately,
instrumental value, obtainable only if that person has performed the action
217
through a social, rather than a market, transaction."
Several empirical tests have demonstrated how incentives may undermine
reputational motivations. In one study, students who collected money for charity
collected less when they could keep a percentage of their collections, which
lessened the basis for social approval of their actions. 218 In another test,
undergraduates were assigned to press keyboard keys that controlled donations
to two charities, one "good" (the American Red Cross) and one "bad" (the
219
National Rifle Association) according to social norms on the campus.
Individuals were randomly assigned to charities, and then further randomized to
perform in private or with a peer audience, with or without compensation based
on their performance. In private, individuals assigned to both causes pressed
significantly more keys when they were incentivized, compared to their effort
without the incentive. In front of peers, however, individuals pressing keys for a
"good" cause actually pressed fewer keys when the task was incentivized, while
those assigned to the "bad" charity did not perform differently when the incentive
was offered. A replication study asking undergraduates to bike for "good" or
"bad" charities had similar findings. 220 These results suggest that the public
visibility of a task matters to the design of an incentive scheme, as does the
visibility of the incentive. When reputational motivations loom large, "crowding
out can ...mak[e] all but very large rewards inferior to [no rewards]. '22
Conversely, negative incentives such as fines may have the effect of
reducing anticipated social disapproval for undesirable activity. This may also
222
be an explanation for the crowding-out effects of the Israeli daycare study;
when parents knew that others would be aware they had paid for their tardiness,
this payment reduced or eliminated their anticipated social disapproval
consequences. A similar dynamic may be at play in the case of the Boston Fire

215.

Gneezy, supra note 77, at 5.

216.
217.

See Posner, supra note 184, at 1791.
BENKLER, supra note 76, at 96.

218.

Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 149. For a description of this study, see Fehr &

Falk, supra note 154, at 709-10.
219.
Ariely et al., supra note 48.

220.
221.
222.

Id.at 552-53.
Benabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1662.
Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 155.
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Commissioner's decision to dock firemen's pay when they called in sick too
often; sick calls doubled during the year after this change.223
3. Agent Self-Signaling: Attribution and Self-Image-Spoiling
A third set of signals are those that the agent sends to himself, and accepting
a reward can change the agent's perception of his own motivation. People draw
conclusions about their own motives based on their actions; when an agent can
look back at his behavior and ascribe it to an incentive, he may subsequently
view the task as less intrinsically valuable,224 and he is less likely to internalize

his behavior as a norm. 225 This is also known as "attribution;" attributional
explanations for motivational crowding-out focus on individuals' perceptions of
their own motives, rather than perceptions of control or of a principal's
motives. 226 Larger, more salient incentives may be more likely to influence selfsignaling. 227 For example, studies have found that people who are paid less to
engage in experimental tasks, including boring tasks, are subsequently more
likely to report finding the task intrinsically interesting, compared to participants
22
paid larger amounts. 1

223.
See Sung-Ha Hwang & Samuel Bowles, Are Incentives Overused in Cases Where
They Crowd out Prosocial Motivations? (Nov. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.hec.unil.ch/documents/seminars/deep/358.pdf (citing Douglas Belkin, Boston Firefighters
Sick-or Tired of Working, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2002, at B1).
224.
See Deci et al., supranote 62, at 630; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Showcasing:
The Positive Spin, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1055, 1066 (2011) (describing how people infer their own motives
from the actions they take, and noting that people who complete tasks for no incentive are more likely to
rate those tasks as pleasant, compared to those who complete the same tasks for rewards). This concept
has also been extended to whether individuals perceive their prior behaviors to be trustworthy when those
actions were constrained by a contract. See Brent Simpson & Kimmo Eriksson, The Dynamics of
Contracts and Generalized Trustworthiness, 21 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 59 (2009). This has also been
described as part of the "overJustification" effect-when we can attribute our behavior to external causes
that "overjustify" our actions, we tend to overlook our intrinsic motives. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Oiland
Water: Why Retributionand Repentance Do Not Mix, 22 QUINNIPIAC L.R. 59, 81, 83 (2003) (suggesting
that punishment leads criminal offenders to attribute their criminal acts to an intrinsic enjoyment of crime,
thereby strengthening their criminal motivations); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart:
Mandatory Pro Bono and Moral Development, 14 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 472-74 (2001) (suggesting
that viewing oneself as externally motivated to engage in volunteer work may undermine "psychic
satisfaction" and reduce volunteering behavior). This has also been described as a form of
overjustification. See, e.g., James, supra note 159, at 553; Winick, supra note 44, at 768-69, 810
(describing overjustification effects through self-signaling in the presence of either incentives or
coercion).
225.
See Fleisig-Greene, supra note 132, at 1213.
226.
See Deci et al., supra note 62, at 628, 654. One legal scholar also ascribed this
effect to "the discounting principle," which suggests that "when there is more than one apparent cause of
our behavior, we will discount the causal priority of any particular cause." Mark S. Sobus, Mandating
Community Service: PsychologicalImplicationsofRequiring ProsocialBehavior, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV.
153, 160 (1995).
227.
James, supra note 159, at 553 (citing research suggesting that "reward size is
negatively related to intrinsic motivation").
228.
See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 84, at 108-09 (describing the results of a 1959
study that asked participants to complete a boring task for money, tell others that the task was interesting,
and then state how they actually felt about the task; those paid $1 subsequently reported much higher
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When an activity has a social valence, such as charitable giving, blood
donation, or recycling, this attributional effect may produce self-image-spoiling,
an analogue to the image-spoiling mechanism described above. Our desire for a
positive self-image may indeed drive some prosocial acts, particularly when
behavior is anonymous, 229 and we often look at our actions as "diagnostic of
[our] preferences," such as preferences for altruism. 230 For example, when
research subjects take part in an incentivized study, they subsequently view
themselves as less altruistic compared to subjects who were not paid.23' Other
scholars have referred to the positive self-image feedback loop as "impure
altruism," 232 the "warm glow, '233 or the "joy of giving" associated with prosocial
behavior. 234 But if our good deeds are incentivized, the incentive may affect our
ability to signal good character to ourselves, even when no one else is
watching. 235 This may dampen the self-image benefits we expect from our good
deeds, reducing self-image motivation.2 36 This theory resonates with qualitative
research with blood donors, which suggests that financial compensation
"pollutes" altruism.2 37
We also send signals to ourselves through acts and omissions that cause
guilt, and guilt aversion can often be a powerful motivation. Negative incentives
can disrupt signals that previously induced guilt, reducing self-image
motivations for good behavior. This provides yet another explanation for the
daycare study. When parents could pay for their transgression of picking up their
children late, internalizing the costs they had imposed on the providers, they
"may no longer have felt bad."'23t Another study incentivized members of a group
to contribute to a public good and permitted them to punish "free-riding"
(noncontributing) group members; free riders were less sensitive to punishment

levels of interest, suggesting that they "subconscious[ly] alter[ed] their attitudes" to make their perceptions
consonant with their statements).
229.

B6nabou & Tirole, supranote 47, at 1653 (citing several studies that "confirm the

importance of such self-image concerns in explaining prosocial behavior in anonymous settings").
230.
Id. at 1657 n.11.
231.
See, e.g., Sobus, supra note 226, at 171-72 (summarizing this research).
232.
Frey, supra note 98, at 410 (2008) (citing James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and
Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990)).
233.
Alex Imas, Working for the "Warm Glow": On the Benefits and Limits of
ProsocialIncentives, 114 J. PUB. ECoN. 14 (2014).
234.
B6nabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1654.

235.
See id. at 1657 ("Later on ... information [about intrinsic incentives) may no
longer be perfectly 'accessible' in memory-in fact, there will often be strong incentives to recall it in a
self-serving way. Actions, by contrast, are much easier to remember than their underlying motives.").
236.
See Vermeule, supra note 43, at 424-25 ("[T]he provision of the reward reduces
the utility that public-spirited actors derive from performing it, if the reward suggests that the behavior is
motivated by venality rather than altruism.").
237.
Chmielewski-Ralmondo et al., supra note 175, at 1894.
238.

Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 709; see also AYRES, supra note 182, at 73-75

(suggesting that a more effective design would be to emphasize the injustice of late pickups by "forc[ing]
one of the (poorer) caregivers to pay money to the offending parent").
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under these conditions, perhaps because they were able to feel less guilt about
239
small contributions.
B. OverjustificationandImpairedSelf-Determination
Besides signaling effects, a second broad explanation for crowding-out is
"overjustification" that culminates in a loss of self-determination. This theory
initially stipulates that individuals benefit from behaving in accordance with their
intrinsic motivations, and one benefit is the perception of control over their
behavior. 24 ° When a principal offers an incentive, agents perceive their intrinsic
motivations to be unnecessary-that is, the task is now "overjustified" by the
combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. 241 The addition of an
incentive also displaces a measure of control from agent to principal, because the
incentive necessarily exerts some influence on extrinsic motivation.2 42 Although
the agent ' could reject the incentive by declining the task, this choice would be
"reactive, " 243 displaying his response to the incentive rather than his intrinsic
preferences regarding the task. Without the benefits of perceived selfdetermination, the agent is less intrinsically motivated to engage in the task at
all. 244 This theory underlies the description of incentives as "controlling," leading
some to suggest that crowding-out is most likely when agents perceive incentives
245
to impair autonomy in some way.
Some scholars have criticized the self-determination explanation of
motivational crowding-out, citing research to suggest that "people believe they
have more control over their behavior when offered rcward. '' 246 Indeed, under
this theory, the use of an incentive actually telegraphs the principal's "lack of
control over the [agent]; the person, group, or institution offering the reward
believes that favorable consequences are needed to obtain the cooperation of the
person asked to perform the task." 24' Thus, people actually "feel freer to decline

239.

See Fuster & Meier, supra note 207, at 23-25.

240.
241.

Bowles, supranote 41, at 1607 (citing E. L. DECI, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION (1975)).
Id. at 1607; see also Benkler, supra note 2, at 324; Frey, supra note 68, at 1526

(citing research suggesting that overjustification may diminish both intrinsic motivation and work
quality); Frey & Jegen, supra note 2, at 594.
242.
Frey & Jegen, supranote 2, at 594; see also Bregn, supra note 102, at 24 ("When

individuals perceive an intervention as reducing their self-determination, intrinsic motivation is
substituted by extrinsic control."); Bruno, supra note 151, at 5; Deci et al., supra note 62, at 628.
243.
B~nabou & Tirole, supra note 141, at 504.
244.
See Galle, supra note 214, at 881 (describing several theories of crowding-out,
including "that monetary incentives are particularly apt to generate resistance because they reduce our
sense of autonomy").
245.
See, e.g., Frey & Jegen, supranote 2, at 594; see also Beretti et al., supranote 37,
at 65 ("The crowding-out effect is more likely to occur when (i) the external intervention is perceived as
controlling rather than supportive, (ii) there is a high level of self-determination of individuals and (iii)
there is a high level of trust between people.").
246.
Eisenberger et al., supra note 54, at 687 (criticizing the self-determination
explanation found in cognitive evaluation theory).
247.
Id.
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a task when they are offered reward as opposed to simply being asked to perform
248
the task."
C. Endogenous PreferenceAdaptation
A more recent contribution to the motivational crowding-out literature is
the idea that incentives lead to lasting changes in actual preferences, which are
learned and reinforced by experience. 24 9 This is referred to as "the endogenous
formation of preferences:" although standard economic models assume that
individual preferences are independent of (or exogenous to) public policy,
research has increasingly focused on the adaptability of preferences in response
to the policy environment. 250 Within a population, preferences may change over
time due to "cultural transmission . . . across generations" or across society as
"individuals imitate other more 'successful' people.251 As preferences change,
2 52
so too might the impact of policy choices, including future incentive programs.
This mechanism differs from other crowding-out explanations because it
proposes enduring changes in individual preferences, 253 rather than task-specific
2 54
changes in the balance of motivations.

Id
248.
249.
See, e.g., BOWLES, supra note 41 (suggesting that market institutions may crowd
out virtues through both framing effects and changes in preferences); id. at 1607 (explaining the
"endogenous preferences" model of crowding-out and noting that preference changes are "a slow process
more akin to acquiring an accent than to choosing an action in a game," given "population-level effects
such as conformism, schooling, religious instruction, and other forms of socialization that are not readily
captured in experiments"); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Public Policy with Endogenous
Preferences, 7 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 841 (2005) (modeling how a policy that incentivizes contributions
to a public good can actually diminish the proportion of agents who value social rewards).
250.
See Bar-Gill & Fershtman, supra note 249, at 842; Vermeule, supra note 43, at
425 (noting that crowding-out effects propose "that the motivations of officials are endogenous"). For
additional legal scholarship on endogenous preferences, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions
as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds.,
1995); Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other
Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75 (1998); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Endogeneity Problem in
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 91 (2010); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic
Analysis of the CriminalLaw as a Preference-ShapingPolicy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein,
Endogenous Preferences,EnvironmentalLaw, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993); and Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interference with Private Preferences,53 U. Ciii. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
Bar-Gill & Fershtman, supra note 249, at 842-43; see also Bowles & Polania251.
Reyes, supra note 2, at 383 (describing a model of cultural evolution in which the distribution of
preferences depends on the structure of incentives).
Bar-Gill & Fershtman, supra note 249, at 843.
252.
253.
See id at 844.
254.
The endogenous preference adaptation model may be more successful for
explaining how behaviors evolve across an entire population than for explaining how a given individual's
intrinsic preferences change over time. There are, however, intriguing possibilities for studying these
changes. For example, a recent paper reports that corporate CEOs who receive large incentive payouts
"may become overconfident," leading them totake more risks over time and engage in "value-destroying"
activities that ultimately harm the firm. Michael J. Cooper et al., Performancefor Pay? The Relation
between CEO Incentive Compensationand Future Stock PricePerformance2 (Oct. I 2014) (unpublished
But as Bar-Gill and
manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1572085.
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Frey and colleagues provide an interesting illustration for this dynamic in
their follow-up study on the siting of the Swiss waste treatment plant. Initially,
local residents were less willing to accept the plant when offered
compensation.255 But one year later, a developer re-extended the offer of
compensation, and 60% voted to accept. Frey and colleagues argue that some
residents believed that the plant would be built eventually; the initial
compensation offer inspired these residents to anticipate increased income and
to perceive opportunity costs associated with turning down the offer. But to avoid
visibly hypocritical behavior, the residents began to develop "new moral
arguments" in favor of the facility.256 When the developer repeated its offer,
individuals with changed preferences carried the vote. Frey reports an analogous
257
process in a New York town preceding construction of a solid-waste landfill.
Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe provide an analogy from the U.S.
medical profession. In the early twentieth century, professional ethics guidance
and societies like the American Medical Association (AMA) imposed strict rules
separating clinical practice from financial incentives; these included, for
example, a ban on physician advertising and financial arrangements with drug
and device manufacturers.2 58 Professional norms shifted, however, with the
development and widespread use of cost-control efforts over the past halfcentury, such as HMO capitation systems, prepaid treatment plans, using
physicians as gatekeepers for more expensive tests and services, and risk-sharing
agreements. 259 Schwartz and Sharpe argue that these arrangements exerted a
powerful framing effect, "encouraging money-making in doctors' choices about
patient care. '260 Over time, the AMA guidelines shifted to permit advertising and
entrepreneurial activities, and the organization now views medicine as "both a
profession and a business. '"261 The organization's preferences have changed,
262
responding in part to the influence of incentives over several decades.
Schwartz and Sharpe identify similar pressures operating in the legal
profession, 263 and Nina Walton has suggested similar processes at work in the
2 64
financial sector.

Fershtman have recognized, "little has been said regarding the precise mechanism through which public
policy may affect norms and preferences." Bar-Gill & Fershtman, supra note 249, at 853.
255.
Bruno S. Frey et al., The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and
Markets, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1297, 1306 (1996).

256.

Id. at 1308-10.

257.

Id. at 1310; see also SANDEL, supra note 72, at 116-17 (noting that communities

often find public goods, such as libraries or parks, to be more palatable compensation for accepting
undesirable public projects, and that they do not crowd out norms because they "repay civic sacrifice in
the same coin").
258.
See SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 200, at 201-03.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 204-07.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 206 (emphasis omitted).

262.
263.

Id. at 206-08.
Id. at 216.

264.

Walton, supra note 28, at 455.
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Several modeling studies, buttressed by game experiments, provide
additional support for endogenous preference adaptation. Oren Bar-Gill and
Chaim Fershtman have developed a model of contributions to a public good,
identifying the impact of a subsidy on increased contributions.2 65 Before the
subsidy is introduced, individuals who contribute to public goods for reputational
motivations only contribute when there is a social image payoff. When they are
subsidized, these individuals will contribute more frequently, including in some
scenarios without a reputational reward, because the subsidy reduces the costs of
contribution. 266 In the long run, selfish individuals will "take advantage of
[contributors'] generosity and proliferate [at their] expense." 267 This effect will
eventually lead to a "decline in the share of socially minded individuals" in the
population, undermining the incentive policy and resulting in a stable, lower
2 68
level of contributions.
Iris Bohnet and colleagues have modeled the impact of incentives in the
form of penalties for breach of contract, suggesting that preferences evolve
within a population and are disciplined by economic success. 269 This model
assessed the effect of weak versus strong contract enforcement on "trust" and
"trustworthiness," measured respectively by first movers' likelihood of entering
a contract and second movers' likelihood of performance. When the probability
of punishment for breach is high, second movers can maximize their gain through
performance; this environment may crowd out first movers' preferences for
contracting only with honest parties because "interpersonal trust is replaced by
institutional trust in the legal system," making it inefficient to exclude potentially
selfish second movers. 270 When the probability of punishment is "medium,"
second movers can maximize their gain by breaching, causing selfishness to
and displacing moral preferences for
spread as a "successful 'trait'
performance. 271 But when the probability of punishment for breach is low, these
conditions crowd in both second-movers' preferences for honesty and first
movers' preferences for dealing only with honest parties. 272 A recent modeling
study by Scott Masten and Jens Prilfer echoes part of this finding, suggesting that
the existence of courts tends to crowd out "informal, reputational enforcement"
of cooperation among members of a community, because-in the presence of

265.

Bar-Gill & Fershtman, supra note 249.

This proposition is the reverse of most crowding-out theories, which would suggest
266.
that the socially-minded individuals would contribute less due to image-spoiling concerns. See supra
Section II.A.2.

267.
Bar-Gill & Fershtman, supra note 249, at 852.
268.
Bar-Gill and Fershtman further suggest that, given this dynamic, using antiincentives rather than rewards may produce the opposite effect by amplifying reputational motivations to
contribute: "a tax policy may be effective in promoting contributions to a public good ...independent of
any direct spending of the tax revenues on the public good." Id. at 853.
269.
Bohnet et al., supra note 9.
270.
271.

Id. at 141.
Id. at 135.

272.

Id. at 140-41.
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courts--contractors are willing to continue dealing with parties who have
defected in prior transactions. 273 Another recent study by Alessandra Cassar and
colleagues found that, in the presence of contract enforcement institutions, both
trust and trustworthiness cease to predict market participation and cheating
behaviors.

274

In a similar project, Bruno Deffains and Claude Fluet have modeled the
extent to which different regimes of legal liability for tortfeasors may crowd out
guilt and social image concerns as intrinsic motivations to avoid causing
uncompensated harm to others.275 According to Deffains and Fluet's model, the
desires to avoid reputational damage and guilt govern behavior in regimes
without legal liability for torts. With perfect enforcement, a strictliability regime
may crowd out both guilt and reputational motivations-reputational
motivations disappear because adverse court decisions do not indicate
negligence, while guilt disappears because tortfeasors always pay for
damages. 27 6 A perfectly enforced negligence regime may crowd out guilt but not
reputational motivation, given that adverse court rulings communicate that a
tortfeasor was negligent. Under strict liability with imperfect enforcement,
Deffains and Fluet argue that there will be "some crowding-out" of both
motivations; guilt avoidance still matters because not all tortfeasors are held
liable, and reputational motivations still matter because only some tortfeasors are
sued. But an imperfectly enforced negligence regime may actively crowd in
social image concerns: not all tortfeasors are punished (preserving some guilt
motivation), and an adverse court decision has the maximum social cost. In this
way, legal rules may "have normative power... 2not
only by shaping [] material
77
payoffs but also by directly influencing motives.
D. LearnedHelplessness

The final explanation of crowding-out may have less modem support, but I
have included it here for the sake of completeness. One research team has
suggested that crowding-out occurs only when incentives encourage mere
participation or low-effort activity, rather than high-quality performance. Based
on a systematic review of psychological research on incentives, these authors
suggest that crowding-out occurs when agents believe that their level of effort is

273.
See Masten & Prilfer, supra note 106, at 362.
274.
See Cassar et al., supra note 106, at 857.
275.
See Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, Legal Liability When Individuals Have Moral
Concerns,29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 930 (2013) [hereinafter Deffains & Fluet, Legal Liability]. For further
analysis of social image concerns in the design of tort liability regimes, see Bruno Deffains & Claude
Fluet, The Role of Social Image Concernsin the Design of Legal Regimes (CIRPEE Working Paper, No.
13-21, Aug. 2013) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2317319.
276.
Deffains & Fluet, Legal Liability, supra note 275.
277.
Id. at 20.
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divorced from rewards. 278 To support this view, the authors note studies showing
that when a principal has rewarded an agent regardless of performance quality,
the agent subsequently spends less free time on the task. 279 The disassociation
between reward and performance may cause "generalized motivational deficits"
and a loss of intrinsic interest,2 8 leading to less creativity and effort. These
scholars moreover suggest that rewards offered only for high-effort performance
can lead to "learned industriousness," whereby exertion takes on "secondary
" ' This body of research,
reward properties" that increase agents' effort.28
however, is mixed, as some studies indicate that extrinsic rewards may enhance
creativity, while others suggest that they may undermine creative
282
performance.
As an explanation for motivational crowding-out, learned helplessness
theory has been criticized on the ground that little evidence supports the link
between "uncontrollable positive outcomes" and the feeling of helplessness,
particularly when rewards are somehow linked to activity such as engagement
with a task. 283 Further evidence suggests that incentives can work to encourage
creative activity, especially when agents know they will be rewarded based on
their creativity. 284 1 will rely on the learned helplessness explanation less in the
remainder of this Article, but I note it here due to the several studies with
285
supportive findings.
11I.Designing Incentive Architecture to Accommodate Motivational CrowdingOut
Motivational crowding-out provokes concern for several reasons. Most
commentators raise instrumental questions about crowding-out, which focus on
how crowding-out affects behavior. If crowding-out overwhelms an incentive's
disciplining effect, incentives may lead to temporary or permanent
disengagement-that is, incentives will backfire entirely, resulting in worse
behavior than before. Even if incentives are effective, a loss of intrinsic
motivation could mean that behavior becomes dependent on incentives-if
incentives are later withdrawn, behavior could drop below pre-incentive levels.
Others have worried that incentives may reduce performance quality if they
distract agents, cause agents to "choke," encourage gaming, or induce agents to
278.

Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 98, at 1156; see also Deci et al., supra note

279.
280.
281.

Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 98, at 1162.
Id. at 1156; see also Deci et al., supra note 62, at 630.
Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 98, at 1161; see also Deci et al., supra note

62, at 630.

62, at 630.
282.
"murky picture of the
283.
284.
285.

For a helpful overview, see Buccafusco et al., supranote 36, at 1935-43 (finding a
relationship between incentives and creativity").
See Deci et al., supra note 62, at 654.
See Buccafusco et al., supra note 36, at 1938-39.
See Eisenberger & Cameron, supranote 98, at 1160-62 (citing studies).
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focus on immediate performance instead of long-term task mastery. Further
concerns include whether incentives will attract different populations of agents,
or whether the displacement of motivation in one area may also reduce it in other
nonvoting displace civic duty, people will
areas (for example, when fines for
286
disengage from jury duty as well).
Crowding-out has also inspired anxiety on the basis of autonomy and
morality. Some worry that incentives (particularly large rewards) limit autonomy
by interfering with motivations, sometimes expressed as the view that incentives
provide "undue inducement" to perform. This is particularly problematic when
incentives encourage potentially risky tasks, such as participation in human
subjects research. Others have expressed concern about the inherent moral or
attitudinal harms caused by the erosion of intrinsic motivations, such as civic
287
virtue or altruism.
This Article is focused on ways to alleviate the instrumental impacts of

crowding-out. When considering the design of incentive policies, it is important
to remember that incentives will not produce

crowding-out when the

prerequisites described in Part I are not present: agents must have intrinsic
motivation for the task,288 the incentive must be observable or expected when the
agent decides whether to perform the task, and the task must be within the agent's
control and ability. Crowding-out may be less worrisome, but not absent, for
tasks that are uninteresting, tasks that are costly (which agents may be unwilling
to undertake without compensation),28 9 tasks with a tradition of monetary
compensation, 290 and tasks for which there is "little or no normative stance on
the behavior" at the outset. 291 In contrast, crowding-out may be more worrisome

when intrinsic motivations matter greatly, such as when behavior is difficult to
monitor,2 92 pricing is difficult, the funds for incentives are low, 293 or the behavior

For a detailed discussion of these impacts, see Underhill, supra note 94.
286.
See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 72, 93-130; SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 200,
287.
at 129-34; Atiq, supra note 4, at 1073; Bowles, supra note 41. A common argument in this literature is
that efforts to "fine-tune" reward systems or make incentives "smarter" are counterproductive. See e.g.,
Kohn, supra note 73, at 4-5. 1do not seek to answer these concerns at present; as Sandel has suggested,
the moral effects of market incentives require a more participatory and reflective conversation, with the
goal of identifying permissible and impermissible uses of incentive mechanisms. SANDEL, supranote 72,
at 14-15. This is not the task of this Article, which takes a more instrumental view of the costs, benefits,
and tailoring of incentives. But to the extent that incentives do produce long-term erosion of valuable
motivations, including moral preferences, I agree that this is an important area forfuture work, and policy
tweaks may not always be an appropriate solution.
See, e.g., MEIER, supra note 191, at 37; Bowles & Hwang, supra note 42, at 17
288.
(investigating the extent of optimal incentives that can contribute to a public good when intrinsic
motivation is crowded out); Stem, supra note 46, at 564-65 (noting when monetary rewards can crowd
out intrinsic motivation).
Stem, supranote 46, at 565.
289.
Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 718.
290.
Fleisig-Greene, supra note 132, at 1242 (referring to these as "low-commitment
291.
laws").
Feldman, supra note 2, at 50-51.
292.
BENKLER, supra note 50, at 95.
293.
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has a social valence. Unexpected rewards generally do not affect motivation, 294
but principals must be wary lest "unexpected" rewards come to be expected. 295
With the overarching goal of addressing motivational crowding-out, my
project in this last Part is to introduce incentive architecture: the deliberate design
and implementation of incentive programs to maximize their effectiveness.
Because crowding-out can undermine the goals of incentive plans, one objective
of incentive architecture is to accommodate-and, where possible, minimizecrowding-out effects. This Part discusses a series of decisions that governmental
and private principals must make when designing incentive programs, focusing
specifically on decisions that may mediate crowding-out effects. These decisions
fall into seven categories: program development and implementation, framing
choices, incentive definition, contingency decisions, information provision,
publicity choices, and options for managing heterogeneity.
For each category of decisions, I identify strategies for intervening in the
different crowding-out mechanisms identified in Part I. These strategies are
drawn from the crowding-out literature. Because the causes of crowding-out are
heterogeneous, principals who are concerned about crowding-out effects must
choose solutions that match the specific processes at work.296 I conclude by

suggesting that where program modification is impossible or unsuccessful, the
type or extent of harms linked to crowding-out may weigh in favor of
discontinuing incentive programs entirely.
A. ProgramDevelopment andImplementation

Before setting an initial incentive scheme, principals should develop
empirical evidence to identify the potential for crowding-out effects that
considers knowledge regarding existing motivations, behavioral contexts, 297 and
the distribution of agents with different motivations. 298 It is important to
acknowledge, however, that some evidence may only be gathered after an
incentive scheme is in place, given that agents may have difficulty accurately
299
predicting their own responses to an incentive.

294.
See Deci et al., supranote 62, at 639-40 (finding no effect of unexpected and tasknoncontingent rewards on intrinsic motivation, and casting doubt on the "learned helplessness"
explanation); Tang & Hall, supra note 98, at 379.
Deci et al., supra note 62, at 656 ("[O]ne must be mindful that people may begin
295.
to expect the 'unexpected' rewards if they are given very often.").
296.
Although other legal scholars have suggested policy tweaks to reduce motivational
crowding-out in specific areas, this is the first Article to argue across subject areas that these solutions
must match the behavioral dynamics that drive crowding-out effects.
See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1206-07; see also Stem, supra note 46, at
297.
580 (arguing that agents should be involved "early in the process" to enable the principal to gauge intrinsic
motivation and optimize program design).
298.
Different types of agents may be affected differently by incentives. Feldman &
Perez, supra note 27, at 436-37.
299.
Gary Chamess & Uri Gneezy, Incentives to Exercise (UC Santa Barbara
Economics Dept., Working Paper, Aug. 22,2008), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3tc3j5x7 (finding that
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Preparatory research for the design of the incentive scheme should also
assess agent competence. To avoid "demoralizing" agents, incentive schemes
should aim for a match between agent competence and the incentivized goal:
goals should be "attainable by the majority of participants," with informational
feedback on good performance as it is achieved and technical support for agents
at risk of failing. 300 Empirical studies have found that "the failure to get the
maximum reward ...could be highly detrimental because the reward structure
is not only controlling but also conveys negative-competence information. 30'
Accurately assessing agents' abilities in advance can reduce the potential for
crowding-out due to signals regarding agent competence.
A powerful tool for addressing crowding-out due to impaired selfdetermination, as well as for addressing the problem of autonomy, is ensuring
that the incentive structure is designed using a participatory process.
Mechanisms for participatory design might include surveying agents during
early stages of incentive development, conducting a well-publicized "notice-andcomment"-type process to solicit agent feedback, allowing agents to vote or
otherwise participate in the decision to implement the incentive scheme, and
choosing administrators from among the agent population to implement the
incentive program. When agents perceive that they have meaningful input on the
design of an incentive plan, it may increase the likelihood that they will view the
incentive to be supportive, rather than controlling.3" 2 For example, P4P programs
in healthcare have been more successful in increasing provider engagement when
providers were themselves involved in selecting and defining performance
targets, and when communication with providers was "direct and extensive"
30 3
regarding measurements and rewards.

The use of a participatory process for incentive development alleviates
autonomy concerns by giving agents a voice in incentive development, placing
agents on both sides of the principal-agent line. Intrinsic motivation may be
demonstrably enhanced when agents participate in the decision-making
process, 3°4 and agents who perceive incentives as supportive are likely 30to5
experience crowding-in of intrinsic motivations rather than crowding-out.
Frey has also noted that when agents have the ability to participate in institutional
processes, they are more likely to view incentives as supportive of their selfesteem, alleviating the potential for crowding-out due to the principal's signaling
individuals' predictions about whether a financial incentive will motivate their behavior did not predict
actual behavioral impacts).
300.
Stem, supranote 46, at 579.
301.
Deci et al., supra note 62, at 657.
302.
Frey, supra note 43.
303.
Eijkenaar et al., supra note 25, at 126; Magrath & Nichter, supra note 170, at 1783.
304.
Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Environmental Morale and Motivation, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 412-14 (Alan Lewis, ed., 2008).

305.
Id.Crowding-in, as I have noted, does not solve the autonomy problem because it
is nonetheless an interference with individuals' motivations, but the behavioral impacts of crowding-in
may be less damaging than those of crowding-out.
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of agent value. 30 6 Agents who meaningfully participate in program design may
also be less likely to view incentives as a signal that the principal is hostile,
selfish, or in violation of an implied reciprocity agreement. Obtaining agents'
views may even help foster intrinsic motivation, which is enhanced when
principals and agents have close or communicative relationships that generate
reciprocity. 30 7 Interestingly, using a participatory approach for the development
of an incentive program may be insufficient to prevent the extreme autonomy
problem of undue inducement. If the program relies on positive incentives that
are indeed "too good" to refuse, agents may very well advocate implementing
the scheme in order to obtain the incentives. Undue inducement may therefore
need to be policed by third parties and remedied by removing incentives or
reducing their size.
The design of monitoring and surveillance options for the administration of
an incentive scheme should accommodate concerns about intrusiveness.
Soliciting agent feedback in advance on plans for monitoring and enforcement
may help to mitigate this problem. Surveillance by self- or peer-reported
behavior may be preferable to direct observation or evaluation by the principal
to avoid crowding-out due to impaired self-determination or signaling the
principal's hostility. Where an incentive is positive, some surveillance
mechanism is needed for administration of the rewards. But where surveillance
is impossible or perceived as intrusive, negative incentives may be preferable,
and some evidence suggests that mandates with weak or absent penalties may be
effective. Successful examples of such mandates include no-smoking signs, tax
compliance, pooper-scooper laws,30 8 seat belt laws that are rarely enforced, 30 9
and parking laws for diplomats exempt from fines.31 °
One of the major harms arising from motivational crowding-out is
sustainability and reduced long-term performance if incentives are withdrawn.
At the planning stage, principals should account for this by ensuring that
sufficient resources are devoted to support long-term and perhaps even perpetual
implementation of the incentive program, including the costs of incentives,
administration, and surveillance. 31 Allocating resources to identify and
counteract "gaming" behavior may also be necessary if the principal is concerned
about crowding-out harms due to reduced quality of performance; if gaming

306.
See Frey, supra note 43 (suggesting that opportunities for institutional participation
increase the likelihood that an incentive will support an individual's self-esteem).
307.

Frey, supra note 304, at 412-14.

308.

Cooter, Three Effects, supra note 184, at 4.

309.
See, e.g., Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the
Expressive Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 419, 429-31 (2011); Fleisig-Greene, supra note 132, at
1241.

310.
See Funk, supra note 185, at 137 (describing these examples as indicative of an
"expressive" function of law).
311.
Extending an incentive for long-term use may also deserve future study; as Emir
Kamenica has noted, there is as yet "no systematic evidence ..
that indicates long-term monetary
incentives can backfire." Kamenica, supra note 142, at 13.5.
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occurs, efforts to address it may be in tension with concerns about program
intrusiveness. Once an incentive plan is in place, continued program evaluation
and adjustment can identify crowding-out effects and opportunities for program
modification as they arise. Trial periods of incentives may sometimes help to
facilitate their acceptance; as endogenous preference adaptation takes place,
312
incentives may grow to be more acceptable over time.
The implementation of incentive programs can also embed respect for
agents' autonomy, reducing the likelihood of crowding-out due to impaired selfdetermination. As Stephanie Stern has noted in her discussion of conservation
programs, staff with a "personalized tenor" may improve the effectiveness of
incentive plans by emphasizing the ways in which agents are treated as
individuals. 313 Empirical evidence from several experimental studies suggests
that rewards are more likely to crowd out intrinsic motivation when the
interpersonal climate (the context of the reward and the style of the principal) is
controlling and pressuring; when the context is relatively non-controlling,
rewards are more likely to be experienced as informational, once again
alleviating crowding-out due to impaired self-determination.3 14 The same is true
of verbal rewards or praise; research indicates that when praise is expressed using
controlling or pressuring language, it leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation,
315
while praise in purely informational language does not.
B. FramingDecisions
In the broadest terms, "framing decisions" refer to an incentive architect's
option to select a positive incentive, negative incentive, or mandate or prohibition
without an explicit enforcement mechanism. Several legal scholars have already
noted pressures in favor of using positive incentives rather than negative
incentives or mandates. For example, Galle has noted that political processes are
set up to favor the creation of carrots rather than sticks, particularly in tax policy;
sticks operate by transferring resources from a relatively small (offending) group
to the larger society, which mobilizes a concentrated interest group to oppose the
policy.3 16 Carrots, on the other hand, represent transfers from the larger society
to a smaller group, which may draw less organized opposition.3 17 Rewards may
also be more desirable than penalties for disciplining the behavior of individuals
or households; "sticks may be undesirable when they fall on households that are
312.
313.

See Frey etal., supra note 255.
Stem, supranote 46, at 580.

314.

Deci et al., supra note 62, at 629, 653. See also Stem, supra note 46, at 566 (noting

research suggesting that "threats, high-pressure evaluation, intensive surveillance, and deadlines can
reduce intrinsic motivation"). But see Tang & Hall, supra note 98, at 379 (summarizing several studies
finding no effect of feedback "designed to provide negative or controlling information" on intrinsic
interest).
315.
Deci et al., supranote 62, at 629-30.
316.

Galle, supra note 63, at 802-03, 840-41.

317.

See id
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poorer than average," or they may fail to deter judgment-proof households. 3 8
Government-imposed rewards may also receive more favorable treatment than
fines during judicial review, and federal standing rules that give individual
beneficiaries a right to sue may encourage coalitions to seek incentive programs
more frequently than other types of regulation.31 9 Moreover, incentives may
sometimes be more desirable, more effective, and fairer than other forms of
regulation when society is highly-specialized or tasks are complex.3 20 When a
task demands far more effort from some agents compared to others, using
incentives instead of penalties can ensure a more equitable balance of burdens
and benefits. 32' And because penalties can impoverish agents, carrots are "less
prone to abuse than sticks." 322 Sticks, on the other hand, are typically better than
323
incentives for managing externalities.
Beyond these concerns, the decision of how to frame an incentive program
has ramifications for crowding-out effects. Where there is a concern about
motivational crowding-out due to impaired self-determination, it may be
advisable to use positive rather than negative incentives, as penalties may give a
stronger impression of coercion. 324 Incentives framed as bonuses may also be
less likely to trigger crowding-out by signaling a hostile or non-reciprocal
principal; fines may convey a stronger message of distrust or hostility, while
325
bonuses may be more likely to convey a message of kindness.
Other mechanisms of crowding-out, however, surprisingly counsel in favor
of using negative incentives. Where crowding-out occurs because a positive
incentive signals unsupportive social norms, the use of penalties may actually
increase confidence and engagement by agents who fear being taken advantage
of by free riders.3 26 When crowding-out occurs because a reward deprives
individuals of the opportunity to signal their good character to others or
themselves, using negative incentives may induce less crowding-out than
positive rewards. Feldman notes, for example, that penalties may be more
effective than rewards for encouraging socially controversial behaviors such as
whistleblowing, where acting to obtain incentives may be perceived as
opportunistic.3 27 Negative incentives may also be preferable when positive
incentives lead to framing or priming effects, or where offering positive
incentives induces moral repugnance. Where there are concerns about incentive
sustainability and long-term behavioral impacts, using negative incentives may
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319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
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325.
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327.

Id. at 818.
See id. at 842-44.
See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 17.
See id
Id. at 393.
Galle, supra note 63.
Kohn, supra note 73, at 5.
See Fehr & Ggchter, supra note 163, at 31.
See Kahan, supranote 19, at 346.
See Feldman, supranote 2, at 39; see also Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1.
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also be advantageous; fines and penalties may cost less than financial rewards
(and may even represent a net gain for the principal, depending on the transaction
costs involved in administering the incentive program).
The use of mandates, prohibitions, and negative incentives may also be
useful to avoid crowding-out due to image-spoiling. Where prohibitions are
aligned with social norms, either from the outset or due to the expressive effect
of law, they harness rather than counteract reputational motivations. "By
explicitly proclaiming a behavior as antisocial, a prohibition may be
complementary with individual values, affirming a citizen's moral predisposition
to not behave antisocially rather than crowding out moral sentiments. '328 The use
of mandates or fines may be particularly effective when accompanied by public
education and outreach framing the mandate within the context of social
norms.3 2 9 One example may be Ireland's highly-visible campaign to stigmatize
the use of plastic shopping bags as wasteful and harmful to the country's natural
beauty, which increased the effectiveness of its newly-imposed tax on plastic
bags. 330 Even unenforced mandates or "aspirational norms" may be considered a
33
form of "soft law," encouraging but not requiring agents to act as desired. '
Experimental research by Brian Sheppard and Fiery Cushman found that using
aspirational norms encouraged more charitable giving than mandatory norms,
suggesting that such norms were less likely to crowd out charitable
3 32
motivations.
C. Incentive Definitions
Incentive architects must make a range of decisions about the type, size,
and choice set of incentives. This Section will refer primarily to positive
incentives, but penalties can also differ along these lines. The choice of an
incentive can drive crowding-out effects in a number of ways. Here I will
consider five attributes of incentives: their type, size, specificity, fungibility, and
recipients.
1. Incentive Type
First, the type of incentive--cash, an in-kind incentive, verbal praise, an
award, or another prize--can influence whether the program activates several
crowding-out mechanisms. If crowding-out occurs because agents view the

328.
Bowles & Hwang, supranote 42, at 18.
329.
See, e.g., Bowles & Polania-Reyes, supra note 2, at 417-18 (suggesting that
combining negative incentives with information supporting social norms can be an effective deterrent to
antisocial behavior, and noting that fines can "work more as messages than as incentives").
330.
See Hwang & Bowles, supranote 223, at 21.
331.
See Brian Sheppard, Norm Supercomplianceand the Status of Soft Law, 62 BUFF.
L. REv. 787, 802 (2014).
332.
Sheppard & Cushman, supra note 106.
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incentive as a signal of their own competence, it may be desirable to use in-kind
incentives (for example, T-shirts, pens, bags); these may limit agents' impulse to
gauge performance by the size of the reward, attenuating the informational signal
of the reward. 333 The use of an in-kind incentive may also reduce crowding-out
due to framing and priming effects (avoiding "a detrimental 'market
instinct'"), 334 the eviction effect, moral repugnance triggered by using cash,
image-spoiling, and self-image-spoiling. When incentives are provided in-kind,
however, it is important to note that communicating the cash value of the gift to
the agent may produce the same effect as cash alone. 331 Using verbal praise (or
shame) instead of tangible incentives may also avert image-spoiling for tasks
associated with reputational motivation. 336 Another option may be to give agents
a choice of incentives. B1nabou and Tirole suggest that offering agents a "menu"
of incentives may diminish image-spoiling effects, 337 suggesting that agents who
wish to preserve their reputational benefits may choose small rewards or forego
them entirely. This opportunity for agent choice may also reduce crowding-out
due to impaired self-determination and diminish autonomy concerns. The use of
in-kind incentives may be particularly useful for counteracting image-spoiling
and self-image-spoiling when the goods can be easily obtained elsewhere. That
is, an agent is unlikely to have volunteered solely in order to obtain a mug, for
338
example, if he can get a mug somewhere else.
Even within the category of in-kind incentives, there is some evidence that
crowding-out due to framing and priming may be lessened further when the
incentive is "congruent" with the incentivized behavior. For example, research
with blood donors suggests that incentives are perceived to be either congruent
or incongruent with the blood donation process; 339 congruent incentives were
those that made the blood donation process itself easier, more comfortable, or
more frequent (e.g., blood screening for health conditions, paid time off from
work, recognition letters, refreshments, and branded "reminders" to donate
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See Frey, supra note 44, at 433.
Beretti et al., supra note 37, at 75; see also Stout, supra note 7, at 557-58
334.
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335.
See Heymann & Ariely, supra note 197, at 792.
336.
This may be more effective "where gaining distinction is the dominant reputational
concern (self-sacrifice, heroism, great inventions)," rather than where agents are concerned with simply
avoiding stigma. Bdnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1672.

Id. at 1669 (noting that menus "may be a good strategy for increasing
337.
contributions," and that menus may also benefit principals by yielding information about the agents' own
preferences). A danger in offering menus or give-backs, however, is that the good deed of declining an
incentive may be "too obvious," revealing to observers that the agents who give back rewards are in fact
motivated by image concerns. In this scenario, agents may never turn down the incentive, and the menu
or give-back option would not remedy the problem. Id.
338.
Id. at 1663.
339.
See Chmielewski-Ralmondo et al., supra note 175, at 1896.
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again). 340 These congruent incentives were less likely to prompt negative
reactions than incentives that were unrelated to the activity (including cash). This
outcome echoes the results of a study finding that loyalty programs for coffee
shop customers were more acceptable if they rewarded consumers with coffee
shop offerings (e.g., baked goods or mugs) than if they provided unrelated
rewards such as movie tickets.3 4' The congruency perception may also underlie
the greater willingness of citizens to receive public goods, such as parks and bike
trails, instead of cash as compensation for accepting NIMBY projects; the
exchange is perceived as an opportunity to strengthen the community in
exchange for a "civic sacrifice."

342

2. Incentive Size
Second, the size of the incentive matters for crowding-out. Here, different
mechanisms for crowding-out counsel different policy tweaks. Mechanisms such
as impaired self-determination, image-spoiling, self-image-spoiling, framing and
priming effects, moral repugnance, and the eviction effect all operate in favor of
reducing award size (or eliminating incentives altogether). The same is true of
some of the downstream effects of crowding-out, including autonomy concems,
temporary reductions in effort, choking, distraction, performance orientation,
gaming, and agent selection effects. Minimizing some of these effects, such as
distraction and performance 343orientation, may be especially useful for
encouraging creative behavior.
In contrast, increasing incentive size may alleviate other crowding-out
effects, particularly if the desired behavior relies on effort or engagement alone
(rather than on quality of performance). Across the board, once the incentive is
large enough, the relative price effect will dominate the crowding-out effect,
remedying concern about reduced effort. 3' For example, a fining system could
provide escalating fines that eventually reach a level that ceases to be a "price"
and becomes a sufficient prize or penalty to induce performance.3 45 If agents
temporarily reduce their engagement due to playing hard-to-get (an example of
relative reductions in intrinsic motivation), increasing award size will also
remove the problem.3 46 Where crowding-out is due to signaling the value of the
See id.Other studies have also found that effective incentives for donors may
340.
include screening for health conditions such as high cholesterol, giving "blood credits," and public prizes
for reaching donation quotas. See Costa-Font etal., supra note 58, at 5-6.
Chmielewski-Ralmondo et al., supranote 175, at 1896 (citing Kivetz, supranote
341.
89).
SANDEL, supra note 72, at 116-17.
342.
343.
See Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 98, at 1162.
344.
This is one reason why some scholars have noted that crowding-out appears most
likely when incentives are "intermediate." See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 2, at 26.
See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual
345.
Behaviors That Harm the Environment,61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1179 n.270 (2012).
Where strategic crowding-out effects are observed, principals may act most wisely
346.
by initially offering a small incentive, then increasing it. But this is in tension with crowding-out due to
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task, increasing incentive size may have two opposing effects: larger incentives
may communicate greater task importance, but also greater task burden or
danger, so effects are unclear. Similar contradictions vex the design of incentives
that may signal the agent's competence (larger incentives may communicate
more positive information about performance, but also may signal that the
principal is pessimistic about the agent's intrinsic motivation), social norms
(larger incentives may signal either high social expectations or high social costs
of performing), and the principal's value (larger incentives may signal either
generosity or a manifestation of control).
Some have argued that, instead of considering absolute incentive size, a
more relevant metric is the extent to which the incentive is proportional to the
effort or task burden. 34 7 To minimize crowding-out due to image-spoiling, for
example, "the items should.., be cheap compared to the donation, '348 taking
advantage of (and preserving) social norms that already favor the behavior. This
also applies where crowding-out occurs due to self-signaling; to reduce selfimage-spoiling effects, incentives should be "proportional to behavioral costs
and performance," and avoid being "disproportionately high. 3 49 Writing in the
area of environmental conservation, Stern has suggested that one way to achieve
an appropriate balance is to use competitive bidding, in which agents "submit
bids stating the amount of compensation required to elicit their participation."'350
But where image-spoiling and self-image-spoiling are concerned, even reducing
the award size may sometimes be unhelpful; "even a minimal concern about
appearing greedy is sufficient to cause a sharply negative response to small
35 1
incentives."
3. Incentive Uncertainty and Specificity
Third, the specificity with which the incentive is defined may matter. Some
have noted that where rewards are interpreted as signals of agent competence,
trustworthiness, or principal reciprocity, it may be preferable to leave incentive
agreements incomplete, 352 which can convey faith in the agent. Wendy Epstein
has noted the conventional view that detailed contracts-those that specify tasks
and compensation in advance-make it easier for principals to control and

social norms; raising an incentive may communicate that the initial offer was insufficient to motivate good
behavior, and that social norms are therefore highly unsupportive of the task.
347.

See, e.g., Stern, supra note 46, at 575-77; see also Winick, supra note 44, at 792
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monitor agents. 353 But more recent research on reciprocity, including several
papers cited above, suggests that less specific contracts can improve agents'
perception of autonomy, 354 avoid signaling distrust of the agent, and encourage
cooperation by "fram[ing] the relationship from the outset as a cooperative
'
Although reducing specificity may pose other problems-such as
one."355
complicating litigation in the event of an action for breach-principals concerned
about preserving long-term reciprocity norms and intrinsic motivation may seek
to experiment with less complete arrangements.
Where incentives are negative, such as fines, vagueness about potential
penalties may be offensive, but nonetheless effective. Feldman and Teichman
have found that agents may perceive uncertain or probabilistic negative
incentives-such as a fine or tort judgment with imperfect enforcement-as less
acceptable compared to penalties that are certain and known in advance, but they
may be a more effective deterrent to antisocial behavior.356 To isolate this effect,
Feldman and Teichman asked students to play the role of a factory owner who
could choose to dump chemicals in a nearby lake. The penalty for pollution was
randomly specified as a fine paid in advance, a fine paid after the fact, or a fine
that may be enforced after the fact. Students were most averse to the probabilistic
penalty, which most effectively deterred pollution and signaled most strongly
that polluting is immoral.3 57 As the authors note, one explanation for these results
is that wholly certain penalties inspire "cost-benefit analysis" that encourages
agents to breach and pay; 358 that is, reliable fines may become prices, but agents
are less likely to view a probabilistic fine as a price that licenses breach. 35 9 (Even
if probabilistic fines work, however, fines that arouse such aversion may
nonetheless cause relative crowding-out--compliance for the sake of the fine
rather than intrinsic motivation-and future research might consider this
question.)
4. Incentive Fungibility
The fungibility, or tradability, of an incentive refers to the case with which
it might be converted to a substitute or another good. Crowding-out effects due
to framing and priming are associated with cash payments, suggesting that
incentives that more strongly approximate cash may provoke stronger crowdingSee Epstein, supra note 112, at 38-39.
353.
Id.,
at 40-41 (citing studies).
354.
355.
Id., at 41.
356.
See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All "Legal Dollars" Created Equal?,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 223 (2008); Feldman, supra note 2, at 27-28 (describing Feldman & Teichman's
paper).
357.
Feldman & Teichman, supra note 356, at 248.
Id., at 253.
358.
See id, at 251 (suggesting that a state wishing to deter harmful activity, even when
359.
such activity is efficient, should make the penalty "as different from a price as possible: making the
payment probabilistic, assessing it after the harmful activity, and directing it to the state").
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out effects. Fungibility is an essential difference between cash and in-kind
incentives, of course, but in-kind incentives may themselves fall along a
spectrum of difficulty in exchange. When incentives are more difficult to replace
or trade, agents may be less able to interpret them as signals of competence or
task value, and perhaps less likely to conclude that market-based reasoning is the
most appropriate mode of decision-making. In one test of this idea, Nicola
Lacerta and Mario Macis surveyed blood donors in Italy about their likely
acceptance of an incentive, which was randomly specified as cash or as a voucher
of equivalent value to be used for books or food.36 0 Approximately 21% of
women and 11% of men predicted that they would reduce or stop donating if
offered cash, but these rates were far lower (both below 5%) when the incentive
was a voucher. 36' Another test of this hypothesis would be to compare equivalent
incentives with a broader range of fungibility, such as $20 in cash, a $20
restaurant gift card (perhaps with an offer to buy it back in cash), a personalized
voucher for a meal at the restaurant, or a buffet provided directly after the
donation. This type of test would help to clarify how fungibility or easy
tradability can exacerbate crowding-out due to framing, priming, or other types
of signaling. To cite another example, some have suggested that creating tradable
emission rights (which create opportunities for individual gain) may produce a
stronger crowding-out effect than imposing emission taxes. 362 The tradability of
those rights-the opportunity to convert them into cash or an option to polluteis integral to their crowding-out effects. To minimize these types of crowdingout effects, it may be advisable to use personalized incentives that offer less
opportunity for trade.
5. Incentive Recipient
Finally, the incentive architect may also vary the recipient of the incentive;
the agent can receive the incentive herself, the incentive may be remitted to a
charity or anti-charity (for penalties) of the principal or agent's choosing, or the
agent may have the freedom to designate the incentive recipient.363 Several
articles have now noted the possibility of remedying crowding-out effects due to
image-spoiling, self-image-spoiling, and moral repugnance by allowing the
agent to designate her incentive as a charitable contribution. For example,
allowing female blood donors to donate their incentives to charity eliminated
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crowding-out; 364 in the case of financial incentives for landowners to allow
public access to their property, Hynes has interpreted this research to suggest that
programs may decrease crowding-out by allowing landowners to designate
incentives for charity instead of accepting them.3 65 If agents can direct their
incentives back toward the principal (for example, if the principal is a charity),
this may also diminish motivational crowding-out due to the eviction effect.
Beretti and colleagues, however, note that a principal's decision to automatically
366
direct agents' incentives to charity may not always have the desired impact.
Rather, the principal should give the agent the opportunity to direct incentives to
himself or a charitable cause; in Beretti's research, rates of behavior were highest
when agents had this option. 367 Similar to the incentives "menu" discussed
above, giving agents the option to identify the recipient of their contributions
may also foster autonomy. Additionally, when a principal makes or allows
contributions to charity, this may promote agents' happiness and cause them to
feel positive about the principal's value and reciprocity;3 68 these dynamics may
reduce motivational crowding-out due to perceived hostility by the principal.
One caveat here may be the need to ensure that the agents support the charity's
mission, or at least have the option
of transferring the incentive to multiple
3 69
charities that support their views.
Allowing agents to donate their incentives to a charity may be particularly
important when the incentives are small, which may assist in the implementation
of a low-budget program. An experimental study has suggested that when
incentives are low, individuals may in fact exert more effort when they perceive
the beneficiary to be a charity, and that many even choose to work for the charity
rather than self-gain under these conditions.37 (The effect was reversed,
however, when incentive stakes were high, in which case individuals exerted
371
more effort on their own behalf.)
When the incentive is a fine, the recipient of the fine may also matter. The
study by Feldman and Teichman described above-in which students acted as
factory owners-also tested whether the participants would be more likely to
pollute a lake if they paid a neighbor harmed by the pollution, compared to if
they paid a fine to the state.372 Students who were asked to compensate the
neighbor directly were more likely to pollute, in part because the payments
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displaced their "intrinsic motivation not to harm others."373 This study suggests
that negative incentives may be less likely to induce crowding-out of prosocial
obligations if they are remitted to a third party, such as the state (which could
then compensate individuals injured by noncompliance), without explicitly
changing the duties owed among citizens themselves.
D. Contingency Decisions

In the context of incentive architecture, "contingency" refers to the strength
of the link between the incentive and performance. Here again, the different
crowding-out mechanisms demand different remedial responses.
First, some mechanisms of motivational crowding-out suggest that
incentive architects may avoid these effects by making incentives noncontingent
on behavior, such as by giving agents "bum money" in advance to encourage
them to attempt a task. 374 This may reduce crowding-out due to an unfavorable
signal regarding agent competence or perceived principal hostility: providing the
incentive in advance and on a noncontingent basis is likely to signal trust in the
agent and a generous principal, activating reciprocity motivations for
performance. Research has documented that unexpected favors or gifts may
"create feelings of indebtedness obliging many people to repay the psychological
debt. '375 Moreover, some research suggests that agents who receive
noncontingent incentives exhibit more interest in a task compared to those
receiving contingent rewards, 376 and noncontingency may promote both agent
creativity and autonomy. 377 Noncontingent incentives can be provided on an
individual or group basis; tax reform, for example, may increase favorable views
of the law among the general population and therefore motivate higher tax
compliance.3 7s These noncontingent rewards, however, "do not provide a means
of expressing appreciation for doing a task or doing it well because they are not
linked to the task... [Therefore,] their primary utility may be in situations where
rewards are necessary but are not used to convey information or to motivate
performance (e.g., paying people a salary for occupying a job). ' 379 A
noncontingent reward may also have undesirable agent selection effects (if it is
not limited to certain agents); the promise of a noncontingent incentive may
attract unqualified agents to attempt performance.38 ° A similar way of insulating
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agents from crowding-out effects at the time of performance is to provide
incentives ex post,3"' as a subsequent reward for good performance that takes

advantage of the extent to which incentives signal agent competence.
Unexpected rewards, as described above, do not give rise to crowding-out, and
some research suggests that ex post or discretionary bonuses382may "enhance
motivation by functioning as a credible feedback mechanism."
Second, incentive architects who choose a contingent reward must decide
whether to link the incentive to engagement (expending any effort), process
indicators (completing interim steps or following a pre-specified process), or
performance (achieving a measurable outcome, whether absolute or relative to
other agents). Incentive plans seeking to avoid crowding-out due to impaired
self-determination, self-image-spoiling, and perceived agent competence should
be designed to reward outcomes, rather than process indicators. This approach
383
allows agents to retain independence in deciding how to achieve the goal,

allows more latitude for creative tasks, 384 ensures a more informational rather
than controlling delivery of the incentive, 385 and may limit autonomy concerns.
To avoid the impression that incentives in this context are controlling, it may
also be useful to design incentive plans to reward high-quality performance
rather than mere participation or task completion: although performancecontingent rewards embed more intrusive surveillance (for performance
evaluation), they are also more likely to convey positive information about
competence for those who meet the standard. 386 (Importantly, performancecontingent rewards may backfire among agents who do not meet the specified
standards for the reward, 387 which is why prior assessment of agent competence
is important.) Although the learned helplessness theory of motivational
crowding-out is not commonly accepted, the remedy for this effect is also to
tailor the incentive to high-quality performance (rather than, for example, to
engagement).38 8 Incentive architects concerned about learned helplessness
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should link rewards to an explicit performance criterion, preferably one that
389
benchmarks performance relative to other agents.
Third, principals must decide precisely what behavior to reward, including
options such as a temporary or one-off behavior, a corpus of good work, the
maintenance of a behavior or goal (e.g., maintaining weight lOss),390 or an
undesirable anti-behavior. Most incentive programs reward desirable behaviors
or the maintenance thereof, and maintenance incentives can be one way to avoid
the sustainability problems caused by motivational crowding-out. But several
intriguing programs have taken advantage of the image-spoiling and self-imagespoiling mechanisms for crowding-out effects to impose anti-incentives, which
reward undesirablebehavior. For some years now, the online retailer Zappos has
offered new employees substantial sums of money ($2,000) to quit their jobs. 39 1
Employees' refusal to accept the offer communicates to themselves and others
that they value their job highly, and incurs for them a "sunk cost" that increases
their motivation "to make good on that initial choice by working hard to
succeed. '392 Amazon has now instituted a similar program for full-time
employees, offering employees $2,000 in their first year, then escalating the offer
by $1,000 each year until it reaches $5,000 (under the heading "Please Don't
Take This Offer"). 393 Ian Ayres has catalogued other anti-incentives, such as
requiring payment to use a carpool lane,394 or punishing someone innocent if an
agent engages in bad behavior. 395 Bar-Gill and Fershtman have also suggested
that, where reputational motivations are at stake, taxing good behaviors (such as
contributions to public goods) may amplify their reputational payoff and solidify
reputational motivations, staving off the endogenous preference adaptations-a
shift away from social motivations and toward incentives-that may ensue from
an opposite policy of subsidizing good behavior.3 96 It would perhaps be unwise,
however, to use anti-incentives when reputational and self-image motivations are
absent (that is, where there is no social cost for the anti-behavior); Amazon, for
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workers, who may have
example, does not offer its anti-incentive to temporary
397
less personal or social investment in the position.
Fourth, principals must consider the extent to which a contingent incentive
is salient to the agent during the time of performance. This is particularly
important for alleviating the effects of crowding-out on performance quality
through mechanisms such as choking, distraction, or performance orientation.
Recent work on motivational crowding-out has drawn a distinction between the
operation of directly performance-salient and indirectly performance-salient
incentives. 398 When an incentive is directly salient, agents can perceive "a clear,
proximal, unambiguous link between the incentive and performance," such as a
sales commission.3 99 Incentives of this kind are both visible and immediate to

agents, and they are likely to lessen the strength of the link between intrinsic
motivation and behavior. 400 An indirect performance-salient incentive has a
more ambiguous link with performance, such as a salary, and may influence
behavior to a lesser degree due to its reduced immediacy and visibility. 40 A
recent meta-analysis did indeed find that the link between intrinsic motivation
and performance was stronger when incentives were indirectly performancesalient than when incentives were directly performance-salient. 402 Other ways of
reducing an incentive's salience may include reducing the size of the incentive,
linking it to a large body of tasks, 40 3 or making an incentive more like a prize
(something that cannot consciously be worked toward). 4 4 Furthermore,
introducing a delay can diminish salience. For example, if the time horizon of
incentives is such that they are only realized after a delay of several years, the
incentives may exert less influence on day-to-day activity. Concerns about longterm performance may be alleviated by structuring incentives so that they may
colleagues'
only be realized in the long-term, such as Professor Romano and
40 5
proposal on deferred-incentive compensation for bank executives.
An incentive architect's final contingency decision is to design the metrics
by which agents' performance and qualification for incentives are measured.
Here, the concern about reduced quality of performance (through mechanisms
See Cohn, supra note 393.
397.
398. See e.g., Cerasoli et al., supranote 87, at 4.
Id.
399.
See id. at 4-5.
400.
Seeid at4.
401.
See id. at 15.
402.
See Frey, supra note 44, at 433 (noting that "prizes given for a particular
403.
performance tend to negatively affect intrinsic motivation").
Id. at 432; see also Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, Abundant but
404.
Neglected: Awards as Incentives, 2009 ECONOMISTS' VOICE I (noting that "indirect incentives" such as
awards that individuals "cannot or do not consciously work towards" can have beneficial effects, such as
identifying role models and reinforcing social norms). Using an indirect incentive may also move the
reward closer to a credible signal of agent competence, rather than a signal of principal distrust. Frey,
supra note 44, at 433.
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
405.
and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 359-63 (2009).
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such as choking, distraction, or performance orientation) could be addressed by
incorporating quality metrics as well as effort metrics in the calculations. For
example, if a school board is concerned that paying children to read books will
result in a "performance orientation" that induces children to forgo difficult
books in favor of quick reads, imposing length or difficulty requirements (or
difficulty bonuses) may help to mitigate this concern during the period when the
incentive is in force. In the healthcare context, payment for performance provides
some instructive lessons on the importance of building flexibility into metrics,
enabling adjustments for difficulty. In order to avoid some "gaming" behavior,
such as cherry-picking healthy patients who will show improvement, some
scholars have advocated metrics that allow exceptions for difficult or
noncompliant patients; 40 6 many have also remarked on the importance of
consulting physicians during metric development. It is impossible to avoid
gaming behavior entirely, and increasing the complexity of metrics may also
increase transactions costs due to monitoring and incentive program
administration. But in some contexts, considering quality in metric design may
help to avoid some of the downstream consequences of crowding-out effects.
E.Bundling Incentives with Information
Several types of motivational crowding-out may be alleviated through the
provision of information, particularly crowding-out due to signaling
mechanisms. When the agent interprets the reward as a sign of the task's value
or difficulty-for example, as a signal that the task is dangerous, boring, or
unattractive-pairing the reward with additional factual information about the
task may alleviate these concerns. Another option is to incentivize only repeated
tasks, so that agents are aware of what the task entails before they are
incentivized. Some have also advocated that principals should only reward tasks
that require "specific high task-performance," which may increase intrinsic
motivation by conveying to agents that the task holds "personal or social
40 7
significance."
When the agent interprets an incentive as a signal of his or her competence
or trustworthiness, information provision is likely to be particularly important
for avoiding motivational crowding-out. Participants should receive
informational feedback on good performance; 40 8 several meta-analyses have
indicated that verbal rewards can increase self-reported interest and engagement

406.
See, e.g., Eijkenaar et al., supra note 25, at 116 (suggesting that programs may
"allow[] providers to exclude noncompliant patients from performance calculations"); Adam Oliver &
Lawrence D. Brown, Incentivizing Professionals and Patients: A Considerationin the Context of the
UnitedKingdom and the United States. 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 59, 71-72 (2011) (citing empirical

support for the idea
calculations does not
407.
408.

that allowing providers in P4P programs to exclude patients from performance
lead to widespread gaming of the system).
Eisenberger et al., supra note 54, at 687.
See Stem, supra note 46, at 579.
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when they include positive feedback on the agent's competency at the task.4 °9
For example, research on P4P programs for physicians has found that giving
physicians direct performance feedback may be as effective as incentives;
several studies found that adding P4P mechanisms to feedback programs added
little to program outcomes. 410 Principals can also avoid delivering rewards in a
controlling way by emphasizing "the interesting or challenging aspects" of the
task during feedback. 4t '
Similar effects obtain when an agent interprets an incentive as a signal of
prevailing social norms. In order to avoid signaling unsupportive social norms,
incentives should be paired with information about prevailing rates of
compliance with desirable behavior; it may even be more effective to provide
agents with information on their performance relative to their peers. 412 Some
have suggested that communicating about social norms may be an effective
replacement for incentive programs; for example, Kahan has described a strategy
for promoting tax compliance that relies on communicating about the high
proportion of people who already comply, rather than providing incentives or
penalties to discourage evasion. 41 3 Of course, these strategies depend on the
extent to which pre-existing social norms are supportive of the incentivized
behaviors; if incentives are used to encourage a socially stigmatized task, or a
new task that is rarely performed, providing information about prevailing social
norms may do more harm than good.
Communicating about the source of incentives may also help reduce
crowding-out due to the eviction effect. The eviction effect occurs when an agent
believes that the cost of an incentive will harm the principal's mission. It may
therefore ameliorate the effect if the principal clarifies the source of the rewards
14
(i.e., funds or a donor source that does not impact the principal's activity).
Communicating about the value of the incentive may also help avoid the eviction
effect when the incentive is small, but as noted above, identifying the cash value
of an incentive may simultaneously exacerbate crowding-out due to framing
effects or moral repugnance.
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F. Publicity Choices
Principals designing incentive schemes have the additional task of
managing the flow of information (to agents and other observers) about
incentives and the identity of their recipients. These publicity choices are
primarily important for crowding-out mechanisms that depend on reputational
motivations.
The privacy or publicity of incentives and their recipients may be most
important for crowding-out due to image-spoiling. If an agent is concerned that
others will believe he engaged in good behavior simply to obtain an incentive,
one potential remedy may be to make the incentive private, by keeping secret the
agent's identity, the incentive amount, or the incentive scheme as a whole. There
may also be notice requirements for some incentives, such as negative incentives
(penalties), and incentives may be particularly difficult to obscure when they are
offered by a governmental principal. Bdnabou and Tirole have discussed the
option of publicly disclosing rewards that are small, but then allowing the
principal and agent to renegotiate reward size privately. 41 5 Astutely, they have
also noted that although avoiding publicity may diminish crowding-out due to
image-spoiling, it may do little to avoid the problem of crowding-out due to selfimage-spoiling. "[T]aking secret rewards does not help with self-image, and may
''41
6 An alternative means of averting crowding-out due to imageeven damage it.
spoiling or self-image-spoiling may be to give agents the opportunity to publicly
refuse a reward, or to divert the value of their incentive to charity. Charity options
can reduce motivational crowding-out in a number of ways, as described above,
but they can only work to reduce crowd-out due to image-spoiling if the "give417
backs [are] observable by the audience to whom agents are trying to signal.
When there is a concern that the availability of incentives may
communicate unsupportive social norms, it may help to remedy these problems
by publicizing the number or names of agents who receive the incentive for good
behavior. Publicizing a large number of agents may help to demonstrate that
social norms favor the behavior, reducing this source of crowding-out effects.
When social norms are already supportive of compliance, public appeals
reinforcing these social norms may sometimes be more effective than incentives.
Regrettably, however, public appeals may not always be good alternatives to
incentives; specifically, appeals to conserve resources may actually increase
demand. 4t 8 One study, for example, found that a public appeal asking healthy
individuals to refrain from getting flu shots (to conserve them for the elderly)

415.
This may, however, cause several difficulties in practice, including commitment
problems that would increase privately negotiated incentives. Bdnabou & Tirole, supra note 47, at 1669
n.35.
416.
Id.at 1669.
417.
Id.
418.
See Steven E. Sexton, Payingfor Pollution? How General Equilibrium Effects
Undermine the "Spare the Air" Program,53 ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. 553, 555 (2012).
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actually increaseddemand because it elevated the salience of shots and reduced
41 9
healthy people's procrastination.
Instead of relying on public appeals or social norms education, a more
powerful strategy to capitalize on reputational motivations may be public
reporting on agent performance. Public reporting programs harness social
dynamics, reputational motivations, and the desire to punish free riders by
releasing information to make social shaming (or reputational payoff) easier.
Peer punishment is a powerful mechanism that can "induce the self-interested to
act as if they were civic-minded, '420 and incentives are more likely to trigger
crowding-in when they harness "moral approval or disapprobation from a
subject's peers. 421' Eric Fleisig-Greene has noted this strategy at work in efforts
to publicize the names of individuals who bounce checks, purchase services from
sex workers, evade taxes, or fail to pay child support. 422 The extent to which an
act is publicly observable may also influence voting behavior. Funk notes that
when Swiss jurisdictions offered citizens the opportunity to vote by mail, the
option did not increase voter turnout; she suggests that the "nonverifiability of
the [postal] voting" behavior may have undermined motivation. 423 Other
examples of effective publicity schemes include a program for Thai police
officers, who must wear pink "Hello Kitty" armbands when they fail to follow
rules, 424 and a program in Mumbai to deter spitting among governmental
employees, whose photos and identities are publicly posted if they are caught in
the act. 425 Reviews of P4P for physicians have found that publicly reporting on
a physician's performance may be just as effective, if not more so, than linking
payments to performance indicators. 426 We might also view such naming-andshaming programs as their own form of incentive scheme, which pays incentives
in the currency of reputational impact. Publicity strategies, however, are in
tension with concerns about intrusiveness and surveillance in program
administration; agents may also experience such programs as controlling,
thereby exacerbating motivational crowding-out due to impaired selfdetermination.
G. ManagingHeterogeneity

Both the measurement and alleviation of crowding-out effects are afflicted
by the problem of heterogeneity across agents in their intrinsic motives, the
419.

Id. at 556 (citing Alain de Janvry et al., Can Appeals to CooperationBe Effective
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extent to which they value a given incentive, and their susceptibility to crowdingout effects.427 This problem can lead to agent selection effects, or it can pose the
problem of multiple mechanisms of crowding-out that demand different
solutions for different subgroups of agents. For example, Armin Falk and
Michael Kosfeld's study found groups of agents that responded negatively,
positively, or neutrally to their principal's imposition of extrinsic control in an
economic game; although approximately 55% of participants responded
negatively to the principal's use of controls, another 27% reacted favorably. 428 It
may be difficult, the authors note, to achieve the goal of "disciplin[ing] the
opportunistic agents without reducing the motivation of the intrinsically
motivated ones. ' 42 9 As described above, crowding-out effects may depend on
variables like gender, 430 culture, 431 or prosocial orientation. 432 The choice to
refrain from incentivizing or controlling selfish agents may be unwise, but the
choice to incentivize or control uniformly may also undermine the activity of
43 3
unselfish or prosocial agents due to crowding-out.
When setting incentives for a heterogeneous population, an incentive
architect might consider several options for designing a uniform incentive
scheme. One is to simply set incentives to motivate the modal agent-the type
of agent representing the largest share of the population. Another may be to set
incentives for only the agents who are already unmotivated or noncompliant,
because intrinsic motivation is a prerequisite for crowding-out to occur. This
strategy has sometimes been used in incentives for health behavior, which are
offered to those with unhealthy behavior to stimulate change.4 34 Notably,
although these designs may avoid crowding-out among the incentivized segment
of the population, both may exacerbate agent selection effects (particularly if
agents are permitted to move among categories). Even though an unselfish agent
may not have wanted a reward for good behavior, she may resent being denied
an incentive that is offered to others; this may communicate that her contribution

See, e.g., Feldman & Perez, supra note 27, at 412 (noting the challenge of
427.
regulating different "types" of individuals in a community); Shogren, supra note 33, at 356 (noting "the
regulator's dilemma" when trying to mobilize both motivated and unmotivated populations); Bowles &
Hwang, supra note 42, at 18-19 (noting differences in "the crowding parameter" across individuals).
428.

Falk & Kosfeld, supra note 153, at 1624 tbl.2 (pooling the percentage of

participants who reacted negatively, positively, and neutrally to the principal's use of control in all three
experimental conditions; across 209 participants, 114 reacted negatively by reducing their performance,
57 reacted positively, and 38 reacted neutrally).
Id. at 1628. Indeed, as Fehr and Falk write, "the negative side effects of... explicit
429.
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Fehr & Falk, supra note 154, at 698.
Mellstrom & Johannesson, supra note 58.
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protective health behaviors are often only offered to individuals with low initial behavior levels and that
existing evidence on motivational crowding-out, which stipulates high initial motivation, may be less
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is valued less, exacerbating crowding-out due to signals of low task value, low
perceived agent competence, or principal hostility. If an incentive is high enough,
agents may desist from their good behavior temporarily, so that they may become
part of the incentivized group. Moreover, when the incentive is negative, such as
a pro bono requirement for non-serving lawyers, 435 any agent who disengages
will then become part of the population to which the requirement is appliedthis type of incentive is indistinguishable from a blanket mandate.
A third option for designing a uniform incentive scheme to avoid crowdingout, as recommended by Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and others, is to simply set
incentives so high that the relative price effect always dominates over
motivational crowding-out. As she writes, "law ought to be careful to pitch
penalties at the right-high-level" to overwhelm the crowding-out effect:
"those with some intrinsic motivation may find such motivation crowded out by
the penalties-but if the penalty is high enough, they will still refrain from the
behavior in order to avoid the penalty, even if they ignore the expressive
function" of the law.436 "[B]ecause the law cannot tailor itself to different
populations ... a better focus remains calibrating the penalty high enough to
deter both groups." 437 This may work better for negative than for positive

incentives, however, because it may be very costly to principals to provide
positive incentives at a high enough level to overwhelm crowding-out effects.
This solution does little to avoid motivational crowding-out, but it is a useful
instrumental fix when increasing the level of behavior is the primary or only
concern. Increasing incentive size may diminish program sustainability
(increasing vulnerability to long-term behavior reductions when incentives run
out). It may also exacerbate crowding-out due to choking, distraction,
performance orientation, moral repugnance, framing effects, the eviction effect,
and long-term endogenous preference formation.
In some scenarios, it may be worth the administrative and transaction costs
to design a program that differentiates among agents. This can help to reduce
crowding-out due to signaling of agent competence or principal hostility, and it
can limit inefficient competition among agents. When rewards make no
differentiation between agents, agents who believe they have above-average
intrinsic motivation may be offended by being treated the same as agents who
shirk; over time, this will lead to a reduction in intrinsic motivation among these
agents. 438 Frey suggests this is a particular problem in public institutions, where
highly motivated employees "over time become increasingly disillusioned,"
439
leading to a lower morale than their counterparts in private industry.
435.
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436.
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437.
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One way to achieve better tailoring of incentives to agents is to create a
program with decentralized administration; decentralizing programs can take
advantage of local knowledge, promoting a better fit between incentive plans and
the distribution of types in the local population, as well as more sensitive "finetuning" over time. 440 Frey advocates the use of decentralized means for providing
state funds to artists, suggesting that support should be channeled through private
parties who are able to delineate among individual artists. 44 1 A second,
potentially less effective way of achieving differentiation is to impose incentives
or penalties on a sliding scale to account for heterogeneity in agent resources.
For example, Sandel describes a $217,000 speeding ticket for one of the richest
motorists in Finland, a jurisdiction that imposes fines based on income. 442 A third
strategy, mentioned briefly above, may be the use of a "menu" of incentives from
which agents can choose. The use of individualized incentives, however, has
drawbacks. These programs are likely to be more difficult to administer than
those with uniform incentives, and they may be more likely to "violate liberal
'44 3
legal and ethical norms ... and prove politically infeasible."
How should the principal decide whether to use a uniform or non-uniform
incentive plan? One strategy is to let the decision of a uniform or non-uniform
incentive scheme be guided by the task itself. In this area, a sophisticated
taxonomy has been offered by Feldman, who distinguishes between three types
of scenarios, with different implications for targeted or "differentiated"
regulation: (1) actions that only require participation by a segment of the
population (e.g., whistleblowing), for which incentivizing everyone may not be
worth the cost of crowding out motivations for the few; (2) actions that require
everyone to act (e.g., trade secret protection), for which it is worthwhile to
incentivize "the lowest common denominator"; and (3) actions where maximal
participation is desirable (e.g., recycling), for which it is helpful to motivate
"both populations" of motivated and unmotivated agents. 444 It is in the second
category where a non-uniform incentive scheme may be of most use, while tasks
in the third category may be best addressed by a uniform incentive targeting
unmotivated agents; in the first category, incentives may do more harm than
good. Incentives may also be most useful for activities with broad participation
445
goals, such as "a target level of compliance" for vaccinations.
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H. DiscontinuingIncentive Programs
The prior Section discussed strategies by which incentive architects may
intervene in the mechanisms by which motivational crowding-out occurs, or
diminish the downstream behavioral impacts or autonomy harms caused by
crowding-out effects. But in some scenarios, crowding-out may be impossible to
remedy by the use of "smarter" incentives. One particularly intractable
crowding-out mechanism may be endogenous preference adaptation. Besides the
use of anti-incentives in the presence of reputational concerns, my review of the
literature on crowding-out has identified no empirically-supported strategies to
minimize this dynamic, which may mean there is little scope for preventing
spillovers and horizontal creep of motivational crowding-out effects. Other
scenarios in which crowding-out effects may be especially resistant to remedy
include framing and priming (if not alleviated by the use of in-kind incentives)
and moral repugnance. Several downstream consequences of motivational
crowding-out may also be intractable, including sustainability in the presence of
limited incentive resources, distraction, performance orientation, gaming
behavior, motivation atrophy (if it occurs), and the erosion of individual or
societal values over time.
In these cases, the principal must weigh the benefits of the incentive scheme
(including any benefits of crowding-out) against its administrative costs,
autonomy impacts, behavioral harms (especially harms externalized to third
parties), and attitudinal or moral damage. The decision to discontinue an
incentive is unlikely to cure any harms immediately if the lesson from Gncezy
and Rustichini's study ("Once a commodity, always a commodity")"46 holds true.
Additional steps may be needed to reverse the effects of crowding-out, such as
public education to rebuild social norms, public disclosure of behaviors to kickstart social mechanisms of punishment or reward, dismantling of surveillance
mechanisms originally used to administer incentives, or demonstrations of
principal generosity to counteract the perception of principal hostility or
intrusiveness. But the recovery of motivations and behavioral levels may indeed
be possible, as demonstrated by at least one dismantled incentive program.447
As this Article has stressed, there are limits to what incentives may
accomplish-but there may also be limits to how much damage incentives can
do. In the absence of incentives, there are nonetheless many ways to steer
behavioral choices in desired directions, which are the subject of scholarship in
fields such as behavioral economics, public health, psychology, and more; some
may include simplifying choices to avoid providing too many options, setting
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default options, asking individuals to verbally announce 4whether
and how they
9
48
will implement desired choices, and public education.
Conclusion
Incentives, both financial and non-financial, are common contemporary
tools for steering individual behavior, with applications ranging widely from
smoking cessation, to tax payment, to support for local development.
Governmental and private institutions alike participate as principals in the
deliberate structuring of incentives to accomplish public and private goals. But
the discourse regarding deliberate incentives reflects long-standing anxiety over
the extent to which incentives-particularly financial incentives-may be
ineffective, inefficient, disempowering, or downright corruptive to incentivized
parties and society as a whole. The concern about motivational crowding out has
been foremost among these worries, and legal scholarship increasingly invokes
this literature without a precise understanding of the processes animating
crowding-out. To date, the legal field has lacked a classification of different types
of crowding effects, and little attention has focused on the specific mechanisms
by which crowding-out may impact the outcomes of incentive-based policies.
But, as I have argued here, a closer look at crowding may help identify a more
precise set of tailored policy design options for limiting the damage that
crowding-out may cause.
This Article is the first legal scholarship to demonstrate how motivational
crowding-out actually encompasses a heterogeneous set of causal mechanisms
and effects that demand tailored responses by incentive architects. In order to
intervene in these dynamics productively, we need a practical set of tailored
policy options that suggest how best to alleviate crowding-out concerns. To that
end, I have introduced many dimensions of incentive architecture, which refers
to the deliberate design and implementation of incentive-based policies.
Regulators and principals seeking to design incentive-based policies that
accommodate crowding-out effects will face challenges. This Article has
identified how crowding-out arises from diverse processes, and given that each
policy context may be unique, a uniform approach to addressing crowding-out
in policy development may be out of reach. But these concluding remarks may
note four common challenges. First, it may be difficult to predict crowding-out
in advance of program implementation. Initial formative research should
consider the types and strength of existing motivations before introducing
incentives, with particular attention to image motivations, self-image
motivations, and perceived social norms. Crowding-out effects may be most
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damaging where social norms are strong, and where tasks are viewed as prosocial
or done for the benefit of society as a whole. Qualitative research is particularly
important when existing motivations are not well known. Pilot testing of
incentive programs should also help identify crowding-out effects and potential
remedies before incentive-based policies are brought to scale. Second, principals
and regulators must make a judgment call on the extent to which these effects
demand correction. Some crowding-out may be tolerable, if the disciplining
effect of an incentive is large enough-that is, the allure of incentives can
outweigh crowding-out, and the resulting levels of behavior may be enough to
fulfill the program goals. Third, as noted above, heterogeneity across a
population is a particularly thorny problem. Formative research on crowding-out
should canvass different types of agents, and although the distribution of agents
may be unknown, incentive architecture decisions about tailoring programs
should consider whether the overall goal is broad participation (for which
incentives may be more useful) or whether performance by comparatively few,
intrinsically-motivated agents is sufficient. Finally, little research exists
exploring remedies for crowding-out effects; remedies for crowding-out are in
their infancy, and regulators have little concrete evidence to guide policy design
as of yet.
Despite these challenges, this Article has sought to define crowding-out and
its potential incentive-architecture remedies, and to begin a more systematic
conversation about incentives, motivation, and the design of incentive-based
policies.

